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INFORMED DECISIONMAKING IN AN OFFICE
PRACTICEt
ROGER W. ANDERSEN*
Competent legal representation requires adequate communication between lawyer
and client. Too often, persons are bound by words a client adopted but did not under-
stand.' Fairness to clients, and to those affected by client decisions, requires that clients
have an opportunity to make sensible choices about how to handle their affairs. Broader
recognition of the doctrine of informed decisionmaking could encourage lawyers to
communicate better with clients. 2
This article develops a doctrine of informed decisionmaking appropriate for an
office practice. It builds upon the medical informed consents doctrine and the work of
t Copyright C 1987 Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, University of" Toledo; B.A., Knox College, 1970; J.D., University of Iowa,
1973; L.L.M., University of Illinois, 1978. Thanks to Phillip Closius, Susan Martyn, Donald Gifford,
Lee Pizzimenti, and Marjorie Downing for helpful comments. Thanks also to Debra Dunkerley,
Henry Hamilton, Dianne Lease, and Mark Geschwendt who contributed research assistance at
various stages of the project. Dean William Schwartz merits credit for stimulating my thoughts on
this topic. See Schwartz, Whose Wealth Is It Anyway? Impediments to the Realization of an Owner's Plan
of Disposition, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 671, 672-73 (1983).
' In an effort to fill apparent gaps in understanding, courts are tempted to attribute knowledge
to the client. In one will construction case, a court was more blatant than most in merging the
lawyer into the client: "The will was drafted by a member of the bar of many years' standing and
experience, and it is fair to suppose that the testator ... had in mind the interpretation of similar
words and clauses in cases decided in this Commonwealth." Proctor v. Lacy, 263 Mass. 1, 8, 160
N.E. 441, 443 (1928) (emphasis added).
In another case, a court said that the client who read a document should have known better
than to believe the lawyer-drafter's explanation. See Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 854-55,
227 S.E.2d 802, 806, (1976). The case involved a property settlement in the context of divorce.
The client alleged that his attorney,told him that increases in his earnings would trigger increases
in support and alimony payments which would total only 15% of his increased earnings. Subsequent
litigation determined that under the clear language of the agreement his children and former wife
were entitled to a total of 60% of his earnings increases, When the client sued his lawyer for
malpractice, the client again lost. Because the language was clear and the well-educated client read
the document, that reading was an intervening cause which protected the lawyer from liability for
his bad advice. Id. at 854-55, 227 S.E.2d at 806-07. It seems odd that because his advice was clearly
wrong the lawyer escaped liability.
'Though this article proposes a broad view of lawyer duty, recognition of such a duty by most
lawyers might well lower the incidence of malpractice claims. c f. Waldman, Lawyers Adopt New
Strategies to Avoid Suits, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 23, col. 3 (cautious firms are reviewing client
relations in light of the connection between malpractice claims and a lawyer's failure to inform or
obtain consent from a client).
Since the nineteenth century, the law has required doctors, in one way or another, to obtain
the informed consent of their patients before performing procedures upon them. See Martyn,
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others who have proposed extending informed consent requirements to lawyers, but
who have viewed lawyers primarily as litigators.' The office-practice focus of this article
provides a vehicle for expanding and clarifying the doctrine in a number of ways. By
offering examples in a variety of contexts, the article gives texture to the general
requirement that lawyer-client discussions be appropriate to the circumstances. Because
office planning often involves parties represented by other lawyers, the doctrine is shaped
to take into account the presence of third parties. Further, because office planning often
results in the production of documents, this article introduces reformation as a remedy
for an informed decisionmaking breach in this context.5
Part I of this article will sketch briefly the history of the informed consent doctrine
and identify policies which support its application to lawyers. Part II will develop and
illustrate the scope of an informed decisionmaking doctrine for planners. Finally, Part
III will discuss three principal remedies to an informed decisionmaking breach: profes-
sional discipline, malpractice actions, and reformation of documents.
I. THE INFORMED DECISIONMAKING DOCTRINE: ITS ROOTS AND RATIONALE
Both doctors and lawyers have been subject to the requirement that they obtain the
"informed consent" of their patients or clients in some contexts. An explicit "informed
consent" doctrine arose to protect patients from doctors who performed procedures
without their patients' consent. Initially, courts treated the doctor's non-consensual touch-
ing as a battery. 6 Later, the doctor's duty to obtain consent was expanded to require
disclosure, of the foreseeable consequences of the procedure, and a breach came to be
treated as negligence.' Now the doctrine is a well-recognized subcategory of medical
malpractice law. 8 The law has required similar disclosures of lawyers, although a lawyer's
duty is not usually articulated in "informed consent" terms. For example, before a lawyer
Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 333-40 (1980); Plante, An Analysis
of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 651 (1968).
See Marlyn, supra note 3, at 321-33; Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in
Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REv. 1289, 1299-1302 (1984); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:
Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 73-77, 87-89, 100-10 (1979). But
see Peck, supra, at 1303-04.
Cf. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in
American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 521 (1982) (discussing reformation to cure mistakes in wills and
will substitutes).
6 See Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153 N.W. 692 (1915) (battery when doctor removed ovary
while performing hernia surgery); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (battery
when doctor operated on left ear, which had serious problems, instead of right ear, for which
patient gave permission); Schloendorff v. Society of The N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914) (assault when doctor operated on tumor, where patient gave permission only to examine,
and the result was the development of gangrene in the patient's arm).
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs
v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rpir. 505 (1972); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical
Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983).
g See, e.g., A. ROSOFT, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (1981); 2
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS. 317-410 app. (1982); Andrews, Informed
Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 j. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Katz, Informed Consent —
A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pirr. L. REv. 137 (1977); Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the
Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580 (1975); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 628 (1970).
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may represent two persons with potentially conflicting interests, the lawyer must obtain
client consent following appropriate disclosures.° Similarly, a lawyer generally lacks the
authority to accept a settlement offer without the client's consent.L° Although the medical
informed consent doctrine is more well-developed, the law now requires of both lawyers
and doctors a level of client/patient consent to protect clients' and patients' legal and
medical interests.
In recent years, commentators have urged lawyers to involve their clients more fully
in the decisions ostensibly made on the client's behalf." Underlying most of these
9 There is no substantial agreement as to what appropriate disclosure would be, nor whether
it alone would be enough. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple
Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 213 n.11
(1982).
"'See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975); Price v. McComish, 22 Cal.
App. 2d 92, 70 P.2d 978 (1937). A client may be estopped from denying the lawyer's authority if
the client led others to rely on the lawyer's apparent authority. See Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 1'.2d 471 (1968).
" See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 124-272 (1978); D. BENDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 147-55 (1977); M.
SCHOENFIELD & B. SCHOENFIELD, INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1981); T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTER-
VIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976); A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). Other professionals have been the subject of similar suggestions.
See Note, Design Professionals — Recognizing a Duty to Inform, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (1979) (urging
adoption of an informed consent doctrine for architects and other design professionals). The call
for an informed consent requirement can be seen as one attempt to allocate power properly in the
lawyer-client relationship. It has a central role, however, because it mandates communication be-
tween the parties. See Maute, Allocation of Decisiortmcdting Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984) (advocating a 'joint venture" model for allocating
attorney-client authority); Spiegel, supra note 4, at 105; Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-
Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1987).
Commentators have offered proposals of what the doctrine would require of lawyers. The most
specific is a statute offered by Professor Martyrs, who would create a new category of professional
negligence. Martyn, supra note 3, at 346. Under Professor Martyn's analysis, a lawyer would be
liable in malpractice if the client could prove three elements:
What the lawyer failed to disclose reasonably foreseeable choices of action in a manner
permitting the client to make a knowledgeable evaluation of the legal consequences
of' the choices; that the undisclosed information, if disclosed, would reasonably, under
all the surrounding circumstances, have changed the client's choice; and that damages
have resulted from the failure to obtain informed consent.
Id. Professor Peck, who adds his own perspectives, has supported Professor Martyn's idea of creating
a new tort. See Peck, supra note 4, at 1292 n.14.
Professor Maute prefers using the profession's disciplinary process. Compare Maute, supra, at
1050 n.2, with Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 CEO. 705
(1981). Professor Maute views informed consent requirements as one aspect of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct's allocation of decisionmaking authority. Maute, supra, at 1062-63. Rule 1.4
(v) of the model rules provides guidance along the lines of Professor Martyn's statute: "A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." MODEL RULES or PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (v)
(Final Draft 1983) thereinafter MRPC]. The comment elaborates: "The guiding principle is that
the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to
act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of repre-
sentation." Id., Rule 1.4 comment. Some parentalism remains 'under this approach, because it is the
lawyer who is deciding what the client's "best interests" arc.
Professor Spiegel would make decisions on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular
interests involved, rather than create another "definitional categorization" of what is appropriate
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discussions is the notion that, on moral grounds, a lawyer ought to respect each client's
individuality." Clients have the right to decide how to live their lives within the broad
bounds set by society. To the extent that lawyers, consciously or unconsciously, preclude
their clients from making informed decisions, that right is violated." Practical reasons
also support increased client participation in decisionmaking. Better results (from the
client's perspective) are likely when a client makes a fully-informed decision." Further,
society in general, and the legal profession in particular, benefit from increased com-
munication between lawyers and clients." In addition, placing greater emphasis upon
the lawyer's role as educator of the client, rather than decisionmaker for the client, can
meet lawyers' own interests in being more than mere instruments of their clients."
Lawyers should structure a planning practice to allow clients to make informed
decisions on the vast majority of questions." The problem facing lawyers is how to
determine which topics to raise with clients. An informed decisionmaking doctrine which
recognizes that different planning situations call for different levels of lawyer-client
communication can achieve an appropriate level of disclosure while still being specific
enough for lawyers to know their disclosure obligations.
11. AN INFORMED DECISIONMAKING DOCTRINE
An informed decisionmaking doctrine should distinguish between two broad cate-
gories of situations: those which involve conflicts of interest and those which do not.
Traditional doctrine recognizes the importance of lawyers' disclosure of conflicts of
interest; conflicts of interest may interfere with a lawyer's loyalty to the client, which is
informed consent. Spiegel, supra note 4, at 123. He views the doctrine as appropriate both as a new
tort and as part of lawyer discipline. Id. at 140. Spiegel also favors "increased attention to these
issues in legal education ... ." Id.
" See Martyn, supra note 3, at 311-13; Maute, supra note 11, at 1070-72; Spiegel, supra note
4, at 73-77; Strauss, supra note 11, at 336-38.
13
 Under what circumstances a lawyer ultimately should make any decision for the client is a
different question. Even if the client chooses to have the lawyer decide, the decision about who
decides needs to be an informed one. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note I I, at 147-55,
197-200. In some cases it will make sense for clients to delegate decisionmaking authority to lawyers.
See infra note 91 (discussing blanket delegation regarding routine questions). In some situations,
however, a lawyer may have a moral or professional duty to counsel against particular client decisions
or withdraw from the lawyer-client relationship. See generally MRPC Rule 1.16; Maute, supra note
11, at 1061, 1064-66, 1110; Spiegel, supra note 4, 117-20, 126-33.
14 See Martyn, supra note 3, at 314-16, 340-43; Spiegel, supra note 4, at 104-10; Strauss, supra
note 11 , at 338-39. Research on the effect of requiring doctors to obtain informed consent supports
the view that better results follow when lawyers obtain informed consent. See Shultz, From Informed
Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 293 (1985); cf. Strauss, supra note
11, at 326-31 (discussing how a parentalistic approach gets in the way of achieving the best results).
15
 Involving clients in decisionmaking should broaden lawyers' perspectives on public policy
questions. Further, it should increase the level of self-scrutiny within the profession. See Martyn,
supra note 3, at 318-21.
16 See Spiegel, supra note 4, at 113-23.
17
 For discussions of decisionmaking in the non-litigation context, see generally Brown & Brown,
What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibility's Ethical Considerations —A Preventive
Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 453, 458-62 (1976); Maute, supra note 11, at 1085-86; Spiegel,
supra note 4, at 125-26.
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an essential element of the lawyer-client relationship.") Because such conflicts threaten
the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship, courts should hold lawyers to high stan-
dards of disclosure and presume harm when there has been inadequate disclosure of
the conflicts.' 9
 A lower, but still comprehensive, informed decisionmaking standard
should apply to decisions made when conflicts of interest are not involved. In both
situations, clients and lawyers should discuss all topics relevant to the individual client. 20
The sections which follow give guidance to lawyers about the scope of the doctrine by
filling in details and offering examples, drawn mostly from estate planning, of how
lawyers should talk with clients. 21
18 See generally MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule). The literature on conflict of
interest is extensive. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 312-494 (1986); Aronson, Conflict
of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1977); Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO.
L.J. 1015 (1981); Moore, supra note 9; Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. Rev. 702, 727-32 (1977); Note, Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc.; The Client's Right
of Consent to Potential Conflicts of Interest, 11 CAP, U.L. REV. 625 (1982); Developments in the Law —
Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981). A convenient bibliography
appears in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 118-21 (1984).
l° See infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
21
 Courts should recognize a carefully limited exception to the doctrine when a client seeks
advice in an emergency, as, for example, when a client desires a deathbed will. Admittedly, it may
not be possible to engage in the same level of interchange that a lawyer would achieve with a healthy
client in an office setting. As long as the client meets the test for testamentary capacity, however,
the lawyer involved should not face malpractice liability or disciplinary sanctions for not having
engaged in, full disclosure. The emergency exception might also apply to a lawyer who receives a
project right before a filing deadline. Of course, if the lawyer has time to reflect on the work, the
law should require informed decisionmaking, Cf. Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co., [1978] 3 W.L.R.
849, 861 (opinion of Lord Diplock) (court allowed suit in negligence where there was opportunity
for reflection by counsel). The notion of an emergency exception is consistent with cases allocating
to the lawyer decisionmaking authority over procedural and tactical issues in the litigation context.
One explanation for such lawyer control is the presence of time constraints on fully informing the
client. Cf. Gordon v. Gordon, 270 Wis. 332, 347, 71 N.W.2d 386, 394 (1955) (new trial not warranted
where trial lawyer "exercised judgment with respect to conducting the inquiry as to the husband's
income ...."); Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1962) ("At
the trial [the attorney] must have and exercise discretion to make such tactical decisions as the
exigencies of the combat may dictate.").
Some cases Free the lawyer from a duty to consult in situations where time constraints are not
pressing. Those cases reflect the parentalistic "lawyer knows best" philosophy rejected in this article.
See, e.g., Duffy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (lawyer can withdraw client's defense without
ccffisulting client); cf. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (lawyer not
liable for failure to transcribe and file depositions or for failure to move for change of venue, as
the client requested). See also infra note 28 for a discussion of the professional standard. One case
recognizes a client role, but still defines the role too narrowly. Woodruff v. Totnlin, 616 F.2d 924
(6th Cir. 1980) (attorney has duty to investigate potential witnesses identified by client, but decision
on whether to call them at trial is attorney's).
The presence of third parties (courts and other litigants) may also affect the way courts view
control issues. Maute, supra note 11, at 1091 ("Effective operation of the adversary system requires
that courts and litigants be able to rely and act upon the decisions made by a lawyer during
litigation."). However, the need for other parties to be able to rely on a particular representation
ought not to insulate the lawyer from liability to the client for failure to consult. The question is
one of finding an appropriate remedy. While a new trial might be inappropriate, lawyer liability
should still attach. Cf infra text accompanying note 183 (noting that the presence of third parties
may preclude reformation of documents upon which they relied). For further discussions of lawyer
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A. Conflicts of Interest: Assuring that the Individual Client Actually Understands
Despite the presence of conflicts of interest, the law has allowed lawyers 22 to rep-
resent clients as long as the client consented after being properly informed of the
conflict. 23 A lawyer violates the informed decisionmaking doctrine, however, if he or she
acts before the client has understood the relevant implications of any conflicts of inter-
est." Because a breach in such a situation threatens the integrity of the lawyer-client
relationship, courts should consider the failure to engage in informed decisionmaking
itself a harm25 and, accordingly, require high levels of disclosure and client understand-
ing.
Courts and commentators have debated what levels of disclosure and understanding
the law should require in informed consent situations. They have developed three
approaches for measuring the adequacy of disclosure. 26 A "professional" standard would
control over litigation, see Maute, supra note 11, at 1086-95; Spiegel, supra note 4, at 123-26;
Strauss, supra note 11, at 318-24.
Some states have adopted the emergency exception for medical informed consent situations.
See, e.g., Kr. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.40-320(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.700.050(4) (Sapp. 1983-84). See generally Andrews, supra note 8, at 206-08 (discussing
courts and legislatures that have adopted this exception).
22 There are some exceptions, where the the law views the conflict as too fundamental to allow,
even with consent. See, e.g., MRPC 1.8(c) (lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer
or a close relative a substantial gift from a client, unless client is related to donee); (d) (lawyer shall
not enter into an agreement giving the lawyer the literary or media rights for information relating
to the representations); (e) ("A lawyer shall not [in general] provide financial assistance to a client
in connection with pending or contemplated litigation"); (j) ("A lawyer shall not [in general] acquire
a proprietary interest in the cause of action ....")
" See authorities cited supra note 18. Estate planners should consult Professor Johnston's
extensive article: Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices — Is Good Business
Bait Ethics?, 45 OH10 ST. L.J. 57 (1984). See also Levitt, Legal Ramifications of Unethical Estate Planning
Practices, 124 TR. Sc EST. 47 (Oct, 1985). For a discussion of conflict of interest questions in the
context of proposing an informed consent doctrine for lawyers, see Spiegel, supra note 4, at 87-99,
107-08.
2' Courts should consider conflict-of-interest consent cases as informed decisionmaking cases
for two reasons. First, the long history of such consent cases can serve as a base of precedent from
which informed decisionmaking can grow into other areas. Second, the traditional doctrine can
benefit from the broader perspective of informed decisionmaking generally. Of course, medical
informed consent cases will also be useful. Courts may be more willing, however, to impose broader
duties on lawyers, as opposed to doctors, if plaintiffs present other lawyer-consent cases as part of
the developing doctrine of informed decisionmaking.
25 Commentators on medical informed consent have considered the appropriateness of treating
the failure to obtain informed consent as a harm itself. See, e.g., J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
Docroa AND PATIENT 79 (1984); Katz, supra note 8, at 164-74; Riskin, supra note 8, at 603.
In the absence of actual damages, nominal damages would be appropriate in any malpractice
action as nominal damages are traditionally awarded for dignitary harm in other contexts. See, e.g.,
W. PROSSER AND R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 75 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEE-rotsr] (nominal damages for trespass); id. § 9, at 40 (nominal damages
for battery); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 14-2 (2d ed. 1977) (nominal
damages for contract breach). Courts should consider a claim involving nominal damages as personal
to an injured client and unable to be asserted by third parties. See infra notes 146-59 and accom-
panying text.
Plaintiffs should be able to recover attorneys' fees incurred in any malpractice action as part
of the damage award. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
26 For an excellent short summary of the approaches taken toward physicians, see Andrews,
supra note 8, at 175-80.
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ask whether, in the judgment of a competent professional, a particular disclosure was
adequate under the circumstances. A "reasonable client" standard would ask whether
the disclosure would enable a reasonable person in the position of the client to make an
informed decision. An "individual client" standard would ask whether the disclosure was
adequate for the particular client in question. Apart from the level of disclosure required,
the doctrine ought to require client understanding as opposed to mere lawyer disclosure.
The individual client standard best tits the purposes of the informed decisionmaking
doctrine because it focuses on the client's particular circumstances.
Because the informed decisionmaking doctrine has developed in response to profes-
sional reluctance to communicate with the persons they serve, 27 the "professional" stan-
dard is inappropriate. 28 Such an approach still lets the professionals guard themselves.
27 See id. at 171-75.
22 Though under attack, the professional standard is the prevailing rule in medical malpractice.
See id. at 176. It is based on the parentalistic notion that the professional knows what is best for the
client. See, e.g., Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
("physician's duty [is) to reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he
should know"); Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (doctors may tailor pre-
operative warnings because the risk is "of' a technical nature beyond the patient's understanding"
and fear caused by full disclosure may have a detrimental effect); Zurich Gen. Accident and Liab,
Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913, 917 (1938) (attorney, because of superior skill and
knowledge so has the authority to act as he or she secs lit, even against the client's wishes); Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)
(111n discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent."); Duffy, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 787,
24 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (1962) ("The trial attorney is in full charge of his client's cause or defense ....
His is the legal knowledge and skill that must be consulted in that connection, not the views of a
layman.") Along these same lines, Professor Freedman quotes Judge Clement Haynsworth: "the
lawyer must never forget that he is the master. He is not there to do the client's bidding. It is for
the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right ....[T]he lawyer must serve the client's legal
needs as the lawyer sees them, not as the client sees them." Freedman, A Lawyer Doesn't Always Know
Best, 7 Hum. RTS. 28, 29 (May 1978).
Several legal consequences flow from the focus on the professional, instead of' the client. Courts
often require expert testimony to establish whether a professional acted reasonably. See Stallcup v.
Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965). Courts
may define reasonableness either under the "locality rule," which holds professionals to the standard
of care prevalent in their communities, or according to a national standard. Compare Robbins v.
Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Kronke v. Danielson, 499 P.2d 156, 108 Ariz. 400 (1972)
and Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 834 (1966) (favoring a national
standard for doctors) with May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 601 (Ala. 1982) (adopting a locality
standard for doctors), Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 269 (Alaska 1975) (same), and King & Coe,
The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 BALT. L. REV. 221 (1973) (favoring the locality rule for
doctors). As to lawyers, compare Woodruff, 593 F.2d 43 (adopting a national standard for lawyers),
Cook Flanagan & Best v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968) (same) and Note, The.
Illinois Legal Malpractice Tort: Basic Tenets And Recent Trends, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 427 (favoring a
statewide or a national standard) with Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269
So. 2d 239 (1972) (adopting a locality standard for lawyers), Viccinelli v. Causey, 401 So. 2d 1243
(La. Ct. App. 1981) (same), Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408
(1977) (favoring the locality rule) and Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 1ND. L.J. 771
(1968) (same).
Further, if the professional is a specialist, a higher standard of care might apply. See Robbins,
553 F.2d at 129 (doctor specializing in obstetrics and gynecology held to duty of care equal to all
doctors in that particular field), Gittens v. Christian, 600 F. Supp. 146, 146 (D. St. Croix, 1985)
(doctor certified as a family medicine specialist held to a higher standard of care than general
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Rather, an informed decisionmaking doctrine ought to ask what a client would want to
know.
If courts adopt the client perspective, the question remains whether the law should
judge the adequacy of information objectively by what a hypothetical "reasonable client"
should want to know, or subjectively by what the individual client in question would have
wanted to know. 29 Often it will matter little whether a court applies an objective or a
subjective test." After all, most clients are reasonable people. The difference between
practitioner), Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975) (maritime law
specialist held to a standard of care exercised by other maritime specialists), Trimboli v. Kinkel,
226 N.Y. 147, 123 N.E. 205 (1919) (attorney who was negligent in a title conveyance held to a
standard of care exercised by all other conveyancers). But see Olson v. North, 276 III. App. 457
(1934) (attorney claimed specialty in criminal defense but still only held to standard of care exercised
by ordinary attorney). Cf. Estate of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975)
(corporate trustee held to a higher standard than non-expert); Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d
404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979) (failure of a general practitioner lawyer to refer to a specialist can
be basis of a malpractice claim).
The possibility that specialists may face a higher standard poses a dilemma for the generalist
in a less-populated area: either decline to take on the client's problem (and possibly effectively deny
the client legal services) or risk exposure to a higher standard of competence. See Johnston, Legal
Malpractice in Estate Planning — Perilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 IOWA L. REV. 629, 685-
90 (1982). The informed decisionmaking doctrine, however, may provide a solution. If the client
fully understands the risks of having the local lawyer work on the problem, the lawyer should not
be held to the higher standard.
29
 In the medical malpractice area, some courts, following the now-classic Canterbury, 464 F.2d
722, have judged the physician's conduct by what a reasonable patient would consider material. See
In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., Bean v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 567 (D. Colo.
1980); Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henderson v. Milobsky, 595
F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The objective standard serves to protect professionals, because as a
practical matter the question of adequacy arises after the fact when the patient knows consequences
about which he or she had been uninformed. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791 (protecting doctors
from "the patient's hindsight and bitterness").
Courts also give other reasons for following an objective standard. Courts have acted, consistent
with the parentalistic model, to protect patients from a "wrong" decision (that is, one the patient,
but not a reasonable person, might have made). See Hitchcock, 665 F.2d at 361, Henderson, 595 F.2d
at 656, In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., Bean, 533 F. Supp at 575-76; Meisel, The
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionnutking, 1979 Wts. L. Rev. 413, 428. The use of an objective standard is said to avoid placing
the physician in the position of a mind reader. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 639.
Further, under an objective standard, professionals may be less likely to shower patients or clients
with useless information. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)
(discussing the risks of a low standard for "materiality" in the context of disclosures required by
securities law).
Some courts have rejected Canterbury and adopted a subjective test. See Scott v. Bradford, 606
P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). See also McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982) (adopting
a subjective standard). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(3) (1975) (mandating an objective
standard).
" See Martyn, supra note 3, at 348-49. Further, the "objective" and "subjective" labels, despite
their common use after Canterbury, may cloud the issue. Professor Katz believes the Canterbury court
"should have considered more the patients' plight and required physicians to learn new skills: [such
asi how to inquire openly about their patients' individual informational needs and patients' concerns,
doubts, and misconceptions about treatment — its risks, benefits, and alternatives." J. KATZ, supra
note 25, at 78. Of course, such an approach leads one in the same general direction as the
"subjective" standard. The focus, however, is more on the process of mutual information-sharing
than on the mental state of two participants. Cf. id. at 79, 84. Because the labels are in common
use, they are retained here.
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the two tests is important, however. A "reasonable client" approach encourages the mind-
set that clients fit into categories and that lawyers should treat like clients alike. It
depersonalizes the counseling and fails to recognize that similar clients are not the same.
Only by focusing on an individual client can lawyers adequately serve the rare client
who wants information which a reasonable person in that client's position would not
want. 3 ' This approach effectively requires the professional to inquire about the client's
personal needs.
In a conflict of interest context, the individual client standard and requirement of
client understanding are especially attractive because the conflict particularly threatens
the client's autonomy. Lawyers should probe carefully to be sure that their disclosures
meet the needs of the client before them. 32 Further, the law should measure the client's
"consent" by whether the client actually understood the disclosures." The notion of
See Scott where the court noted, "No the extent the plaintiff.., would have declined the
proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have consented, a
patient's right of self-determination is irrevocably lost. The basic right to know and decide is the
reason for the full-disclosure rule." Scott, 606 P.2d at 559. See also Comment, Informed Consent: From
Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REV, 172, 199 (1981) [here-
inafter Comment, Informed Consent]. Cf. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of A
Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 636, 655 (1977) (stating that "courts find
some areas in which a [criminal] defendant's desirei, even if irrational, are so important that they
supercede the benefits of counsel").
Courts should not, however, interpret focus on the individual client in a way which would
make the proof problem more difficult for claimants. If the claimant cannot establish that the
particular client in question wanted particular information, but can prove that a reasonable client
would have, the claimant would have established a violation. Rather, the point of the individual
client standard is that a professional will not be protected by only disclosing what a reasonable client
would want.
52
 Meeting such an obligation will not be easy. The lawyer should engage the client in a
conversation which gives the client opportunities to reveal gaps in understanding. Cf J. KATZ, supra
note 25, at 78 ("Physicians should not try to 'second-guess' patients or 'sense' how they will react.
Instead, they need to explore what questions require further explanation"). Then the lawyer can
attempt to fill the gaps. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11.
One might ask how much clients, especially unsophisticated ones, will be able to understand.
Sophisticated understanding, however, is not the goal. Rather, the client need only understand
enough of the basics to be able to make an informed choice. Good lawyers have learned how to
communicate with each other; with some change in emphasis, they ought to be able to apply those
skills toward communicating with clients. See Strauss, supra note II, at 341-49. Cf. President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, VOL two: Appendices, 12-13 (medical patients can understand
medical information if explained simply).
55
 The question of lack of understanding has not received much attention by courts because
most of the cases involve the failure to disclose any information. See, e.g., Spector v. Mermelstein,
361 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (attorney failed to advise client of known facts which would have
caused client not to loan money to corporation owning a gambling casino); Republic Oil Corp. v.
Danziger, 400 N.E.2d 1315 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (attorney negligent in failing to disclose to client
the existing perfected security interest in heating and cooling equipment on the property the client
was purchasing); in re Finn, 54 A.D.2d 503, 389 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976) (attorney disbarred for, among
other things, failure to disclose to client beneficiary the purchase of real property with trust funds).
Some courts, however, have indicated they will ask whether the individual understood the
information disclosed. See Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 187-88, 286 N.W.2d 573, 580 (1980)
(court relied upon plaintiff's perception of the responses to her questions and the fact that plaintiff
did not understand the contents of the instruments involved in purchase and mortgage of property);
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) (In a medical malpractice
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mutual information sharing is central to an informed decisionmaking doctrine; mutuality
can be achieved only by requiring that the particular client in question understands the
choices to be made and their consequences.
Conflicts in planning circumstances are likely to be one of two types: the lawyer may
be representing clients who themselves have conflicting interests or the lawyer may have
personal conflicts with the client. In either of these cases, the conflicts might be so strong
as to bar the lawyer from acting. 34 In most cases, however, an adequately informed client
is able to consent to the representation despite the conflict. A rule barring clients'
opportunity to consent would preclude clients from obtaining the representation they
choose.
Multiple representation in an estate planning context" will usually involve a lawyer
representing a family whose members have conflicting interests. A common estate plan
would give a surviving parent lifetime income interest in a trust and perhaps a power
to invade the corpus. After the death of this parent, the children would have a right
either to income or to distribution of their shares of the fund.
In such a situation, disputes may ultimately arise on a variety of questions. Before
accepting the representation, the lawyer's obligation is to educate all potential clients
about the nature of these potential disputes. For example, a life tenant and a remain-
derman may disagree about whether the trustee should allocate particular receipts or
expenditures to principal or to income. 36
 Also, the parent's exercise of the power to
invade the corpus would reduce the shares of the children. If the invasion power is
subject to any limitation,” questions might arise as io whether the parent's exercise was
within the parent's power under the document. Fui-thermore, if the lawyer also repre-
sents the trustee (who could be a family member), a whole range of potential trustee-
beneficiary conflicts arises." In order to comply with the informed decisionmaking
case, the jury was to decide if the defendant doctor was guilty of assault and battery based upon,
among other things, the perception by the plaintiff of the discussions between plaintiff and defen-
dant.)
See generally MRPC 1.8(c), (d), (e), (j). Professor Johnston bas,,projii;id that some common
practices be prohibited. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 84-86 (will named drafting attorney as
beneficiary), 112-14 (will named drafting attorney as attorney for the estate), 133 (attorneY "safe-
keeping" of will). From the perspective of the informed decisionmaking doetriiie, the important
point is that if courts allow such practices to continue at all, they should allow thern only after kitty
informed decisions by the clients.
55
 In other planning contexts, lawyers will often be representing entities, like corporations, and
at the same time representing individuals, like corporate officers, whose interests may conflict with
each other or those of the entity. See generally G. C. HAZARD, JR., & W. W. Hones, THE Law OF
LAWVERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 231-68 (1985) (dis-
cussing entity clients, with specific reference to the Al3A's Model Rules).
Representation of both buyer and seller in the sale of real estate is among the most common
multi-party conflict situations planners face outside of estate planning. See, e.g., In re Lanza, 65 N.J.
347, 322 A.2d 445 (1974); In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 194 A.2d 236 (1963). Another common conflict
is the representation of both parties to a divorce. See e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno
County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
56 See, e.g., In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961) (included disputes about
how to treat stock dividends).
37
 The trust may limit powers because the creator of the trust was unwilling to grant unlimited
power to the surviving spouse. Tax considerations often play a decisive role; powers restricted by
an "ascertainable standard" will not bring the property subject to the power into the gross estate of
the donee of the power. See I.R.C. 2041 (b)(1)(A) (1982).
" The trustee might disagree with some beneficiaries about either of the issues noted in the
March 1987]	 INFORMED DECISIONMAKING	 235
doctrine in this situation, the lawyer should be sure all parties understand that such
potential conflicts exist and that they understand enough of the substantive law to be
able to evaluate how important the conflicts are to them." Only then can the client make
an informed decision about whether to hire the lawyer and how much to rely upon the
lawyer's advice.
In the very nature of an estate planning practice, conflicts also will arise directly
between the lawyer and the client.d° Because the lawyer who serves as planner usually
expects to be hired as lawyer for the estate of the client, and because common practice
often ties legal fees into the size of the estate, lawyers have an interest in maximizing
the size of the probate estate. Clients, on the other hand, may prefer to save on probate
costs (and their attendant legal fees) by employing inexpensive probate-avoidance de-
vices, especially joint tenancies. When explaining the advantages and disadvantages of
various planning devices, a lawyer should be sure the client understands the lawyer's
personal stake in the option being discussed:"
text: principal/income allocation and scope of invasion powers. Virtually any interpretation problem
could involve the trustee. In particular, trustees and beneficiaries would be likely to disagree over
interpretations which directly affect them, such as the scope of the trustee powers, the appropri-
ateness of fees, or the accuracy of accountings. For a discussion of ethical problems faced by lawyers
in the context of trust terminations, see Dobris, Ethical Problems for Lawyers upon Trust Terminations:
Conflicts of Interest, 38 U. Miami L. REV. 1 (1983).
3" See MRPC Rule 1.7(b)(2) ("When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and risks involved").
Another example is that of a husband and wife who seek estate plans. In most states, lawyers
should inform both spouses of their right (and their spouse's right) to reject will provisions on their
behalf and instead elect to take a statutory share. See generally T. •rktivsoN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF WILLS 33 (2d ed. 1953). Further, in many places lawyers should inform clients that spousal
claims can often be reduced to next to nothing, usually by using an inter vivos trust to "empty" the
estate so that little is left against which to elect. See Johnson v. La Grange St. Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342,
383 N.E.2d 185 (1978). But see Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864,460 N.E.2d 572 (1984) (prospec-
tively ruling that an inter vivos trust over which the deceased spouse had a general power of
appointment created by the deceased spouse during the marriage is part of the estate against which
the surviving spouse can elect). For comprehensive discussion of the approach of the Uniform
Probate Code to spousal disinheritance, see Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform
Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977).
A discussion of the potential conflicts in this context is unlikely to be long, because most persons
have no interest in disinheriting their spouses. See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution
in Search of a Problem, 33 U. Cm. L. RF.v. 681, 715 (1966) ("The married testator on the whole
shows little inclination to avenge himself at death for the slights and frictions of marital bliss");
Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L. REV. 277,
316-17 (1975) ("There was virtually no indication that spouses of either sex used dispositive
instruments to deprive the surviving spouse of any of the property the couple had accumulated
during marriage."). Of course, one reason those studies might not have found disinheritance
common could be that the clients did not know it was possible.
40 One common conflict outside of estate planning involves the lawyer who represents a client
buying or selling a business in which the lawyer has an interest. See, e.g., People v. Razatos, 636
P,2d 666 (Colo. 1981).
4 ' A similar conflict arises when the family of a decedent asks whether probate of an estate is
necessary. If creditors will be paid and there are no problems clearing title to property, probate
(and the attendant legal fees) may not be required.
Professor Johnston's perceptive article discusses a series of other common practices by estate
planners which raise conflict of interest issues: naming the lawyer/drafter as beneficiary, as attorney
for the estate, or as trustee or executor; "safekeeping" the will, in the hope that new business will
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This discussion has not sought to list all of the circumstances in which planners
would breach an informed decisionmaking doctrine if they failed to disclose conflicts.
Rather, by highlighting a few familiar practices in one area of law, the section has sought
to identify the types of situations which always call for fully-informed client decisions.
As the law already recognizes, lawyers have a duty to disclose conflicts of interest. Such
a duty is consistent with the theory of informed decisionmaking. When facts bear upon
the heart of the lawyer-client relationship, lawyers should disclose those facts and clients
should understand their importance.
B. When No Conflicts of Interests Are Present: Assuring that the Individual Client Has the
Relevant Information
One tendency of lawyers is to view many relevant issues as "too trivial" 42 to require
client consultation. Some "trivial" issues do affect clients and their successors, however,
and adequate representation requires discussion of issues relevant to the individual
client."' The standard "relevant to the individual client" is a broad one. Like the disclo-
sure standard in conflict of interest cases, the standard in non-conflict cases should be
the subjective, individual client approach. Any more restrictive standard would under-
mine the principal purpose of the representation — to effectuate the client's particular
(even peculiar) intention." Lawyers ill-serve their clients when they effectively make
decisions for clients by not providing a client enough information upon which to base
an informed decision. Whether the result of planning is embodied in a set of corporate
documents or in a trust and pour-over will, when only one party is involved, the focus
of the process should be on producing a plan which meets the desires of the particular
client. If other parties will become involved, as when a contract is contemplated, the
accompany its retrieval. A more subtle conflict exists when the drafting lawyer recommends the
naming of a corporate fiduciary when the lawyer knows of the fiduciary's policy to hire the drafting
lawyer as lawyer for the estate. Another conflict is present when lawyers fail to offer "self-proved"
clauses as part of their will executions. Such clauses can greatly simplify the admission of the will
to probate in jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Probate Code section 2-504. See
Johnston, supra note 23, at 115-24, 133-40.
, 9Cf. infra note 84 (questioning whether the non-tax consequences of various provisions inserted
to achieve tax savings are too trivial to raise).
" Expert testimony, from other lawyers, would be appropriate to establish what options would
be available to a client in particular circumstances. Lay testimony should address the question of
whether any particular client would have chosen a particular option. See generally supra notes 30-
33 (discussing a subjective test of client understanding).
" See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Further, courts' decisions reflect emphasis
upon individuality when they purport to interpret documents by judging their meaning not by
what a reasonable person would have meant, but by what the individuals involved in the transaction
meant. See In re Smith's Will, 254 N.Y. 283, 290, 172 N.E. 499, 501, (1930) ("[t]he question is
whether ... [extrinsic evidence] indicate[s] that the literal meaning of the language employed is
not in accord with the meaning which the testatrix intended to give it . . ."); in re Estate of Houston,
414 Pa. 579, 585, 201 A.2d 592, 595 (1964) ("[w]e first place ourselves in the armchair of the
testator and remember that the intention of the testator is the polestar in the construction of every
will."). But see Birchcrest Bldg. Co. v. Plaskove, 369 Mich. 631, 637, 120 N.W.2d 819, 823 (1963)
("the law presumes that the parties understand the import of the contract and had the intention
manifested by its terms").
Sometimes a court will state, for example, that it is following the intention of a testator, when
it is really foisting a technical meaning upon him or her. See, e.g., Proctor v. Lacy, 263 Mass. I, 8,
160 N.E. 441, 443 (1928) (quoted supra note I).
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ultimate goal should be to produce a plan meeting the desires of all participants. Some
give and take may be required, but the lawyers for each party initially should focus upon
the particular needs of their clients. 45 In order for documents to reflect what clients
really intend, lawyers should be sure their clients understand" the factors which the
client would find relevant to a decision. Further, the use of a "relevant" standard requires
at least a preliminary inquiry into a wide range of issues. 47 A client's response to such
general discussions will determine how much additional information the lawyer should
introduce.
The relevance standard does provide, however, a limit on disclosures. Clients will
need only general descriptions of some topics, but more detailed information on others.
Three typical estate planning problem areas — discussions of non-tax consequences of
planning decisions, discussions of options available to clients, and use of boilerplate —
illustrate how lawyers and clients should communicate.
Tax savings will often be an important goal of estate planning clients. 48 Before a
client can make an informed decision about whether or how much to focus on tax
45 Cf. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy — Especially in Commercial
Transactions, 46 CoLust. L. REV. 167, 185 (1946) (noting the importance to a commercial lawyer of
knowing the client's business). Of course, in order adequately to represent the client, the lawyer
needs to look beyond the individual situation to the needs of the society at large. See Llewellyn, The
Crafts of Law Re-Valued, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1942).
46 As a threshold matter, a client must have mental capacity; an "incompetent" person cannot
make intelligent choices. The appropriate test for measuring the adequacy of a client's mental
capacity to understand a lawyer's explanation ought to be the same as the test appropriate fur the
document being produced. For example, if the client is about to sign a partnership agreement, the
test would be that for contracts. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE. LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 8-10
(2d ed. 1977). Mental capacity to contract exists unless a party "does not understand the nature
and consequences of his act at the time of the transaction." Id. Furthermore, a contract is voidable
if the party "by reason of mental illness or defect ... is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of this condition." Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I 8C (1982)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
ft 15 (1982). If the lawyer has prepared a will, the lower testamentary capacity standard would
apply. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 51 (2d ed. 1953) (To have testamentary
capacity, a person must understand the nature and extent of his or her property, the objects of his
or her bounty, and the disposition of his or her property. In addition, a person must be capable of
appreciating the relationship of these elements and forming an orderly desire for the disposition
of his or her property.).
Though often a contract in form, an unfunded revocable inter vivos trust is primarily a will
substitute; a court should measure a client's ability to understand a lawyer's explanation of the trust
by the testamentary standard. See R.W, Effland, Trusts and Estate Planning, in THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 128 (1976). Because an irrevocable inter vivos trust, usually
executed primarily for tax reasons, has binding lifetime consequences, perhaps a court should judge
its validity (and the ability of the client to understand an explanation of it) by the contract standard.
Cf. id. (stressing the coincidence of revocability of revocable trusts and wills). A funded, revocable
inter vivos trust stands between an irrevocable inter vivos trust (more like a contract) and an
unfunded, recoverable inter vivos trust (more like a will). The contract competency standard is
more appropriate if a revocable, inter vivos trust is funded by more than a token amount, because
the trust involves an ongoing relationship between the settlor (who can revoke) and the trustee.
" Doctors must provide "material" information to their patients. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at
787-88; Scott, 606 P.2d at 558. Authorities on medical informed consent, however, disagree on the
appropriate scope of "material." See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 n,84-788 n.89. The text uses the
term "relevant" in order to indicate a broad range of topics and avoid identification with the
narrower definitions of "material."
48 Tax savings for the client may often become the lawyer's primary goal. cf. Peck, supra note
238	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:225
savings, however, the lawyer must explain the restrictions tax laws impose on freedom
of disposition. ThuS, there is a close tie between traditional notions of competence and
the informed decisionmaking doctrine. Only by knowing the substance of the law can a
lawyer recognize when a particular topic could be relevant to the client. The focus of
informed decisionmaking, as a branch of competence generally, is not so much on the
accuracy of the lawyer's advice as on the adequacy of lawyer-client communication about
the problem.
The situation which arose in Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner illustrates the type
of discussion lawyers and clients should have. 49 The question in Mittleman was whether
a gift in trust to a decedent's widow qualified for the federal estate tax marital deduction.
To qualify for the deduction, the trust had to give the spouse all of the income from
her share in at least annual payments." The trust stated as a purpose "Rio provide for
the proper support, maintenance, welfare and comfort" of the widow.s' Because other
trust provisions referred to the corpus, the court treated this provision as a direction to
the trustee regarding incorne. 52 The Commissioner argued that the trust did not give
Mittleman's widow all of the trust income, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. It looked
to other language in the trust, noted the small size of the corpus, and concluded that
Mittleman expected that all of the income would be needed for his wife's support."
More important for our purposes, the court also relied on the testimony of the lawyer
who drafted the document. The lawyer said that Mittleman wanted to qualify for the
marital deduction. 54 The court stated "where a testator intends to create a trust qualifying
for the marital deduction, ambiguities in his will should, if possible, be resolved in favor
of success in that endeavor."'" Because the trust, as interpreted, gave all of the income
at least annually to the widow, the court allowed a marital deduction.
The problem with the case from the perspective of informed decisionmaking is that,
despite the lawyer's testimony that Mittleman wanted to qualify for the marital deduction,
Mittleman seems never to have formed any specific intention to qualify for the deduction
by expressly giving his wife a greater income right than the right to receive support." It appears
4, at 1303 ("I believe that ... persons ... receive advice based upon an unstated assumption of the
lawyers that the major concern of the client is to avoid or minimize taxes."). One reason for this
tendency may be that for many clients, that is their primary goal; consequently, a lawyer treats any
particular client like the others. Another reason for this tendency may be that if tax savings are the
goal, the lawyer has available a set of familiar techniques. If other goals emerge, they are likely to
be more individualized, such as caring for a disabled parent, and thus require treading on unfamiliar
ground. One technique for avoiding over-emphasis on taxes is to ask the client to give details on
desired outcomes. Once it is established where the client wants to go, the lawyer can raise the issue
of tax consequences. Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1088-89
(1979).
49 522 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For an enlightening discussion of Mittleman, see Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 5, at 552-54, 584-85. See also infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
'" 522 F.2d at 135 (citing 26 C.F.R. Sec. 20.2056(b)-5 (1975)).
5, Mittleman, 522 F.2d at 133 n.l.
" Id. at 138.
"Id. at 138-40.
54 Id. at 140 n.55,
"Id. at 140. Professors Langbein and Waggoner point out that the will had no ambiguity and
that the court was really rewriting the will to cure the lawyer's mistake. Langbein & Waggoner,
supra note 5, at 554. For a discussion of the appropriateness of using reformation as a remedy in
informed decisionmaking cases, see infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text.
55 There seems to be little question that Mittleman would have given all the income to his wife,
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that the lawyer did not know the tax code well enough to have asked whether the client
wanted to save taxes at the "cost" of giving his wife the total trust income, instead of
only support. The informed decisionmaking doctrine would not require every client to
confront the tradeoff between maximizing tax savings and pursuing other goals. When
the clieitt expresses a desire for particular tax savings, however, the costs, in terms of
other possible client goals, become relevant to the discussion.
The availability of an "unlimited" marital deduction also poses tradeoff questions
which may be relevant to a particular client. If a decedent gives all of her property to
her surviving spouse, the decedent's estate will escape all estate tax:" At the death of
the survivor, however, any unconsumed property would be included in the survivor's
gross estate." A decedent who chose to give some property to others, say to her children,
might suffer taxes in her estate, but might lower the amount of tax in the survivor's
estate." Much of the literature on how best to decide whether to take maximum advan-
tage of the marital deduction focuses upon such questions as the relative wealth of the
spouses and the survivor's life expectancy."° Lawyers often view the issue in dollar terms:
will the value of tax deferral — escaping estate taxes in the decedent's estate — exceed
the cost of taxation in a higher bracket when taxation comes later? Often understated
or ignored,61 however, is an additional question: are there non-tax reasons why the client
might prefer not to give everything to the spouse? For example, the children might have
greater need for the funds than the spouse. Once a client expresses interest in using the
marital deduction, both tax and non-tax considerations become relevant. It would be a
breach of the informed decisionmaking doctrine for the lawyer not to engage in discus-
sions on those topics.
Powers of appointment pose a similar problem. Someone given a power to direct
that trust property be paid to himself will be said to have a general power of appointment
unless an "ascertainable standard" defined in the tax code limits the power.° 2 Property
over which a decedent had an unlimited general power of appointment is included in
the decedent's gross estate. 63 Yet before a lawyer automatically limits someone's power
to an ascertainable standard, the lawyer and client should discuss whether the client
would prefer the tax savings a limited power would bring or the flexibility of an unlimited
power. The effect of an informed decisionmaking doctrine on a tax planning practice
would be to focus more attention on discussing both tax and non-tax questions with
had he confronted the question. See Mittleman, 552 F.2d at 138-39. The question of what a fully
informed client would have done often will be critical in informed decisionmaking cases. See infra
notes 116-33 and notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
57 See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1982).
5" See id. at 2033.
5" To the extent that a decedent gives others non-charitable gifts which total less than the
amount sheltered by the available unified credit, those gifts would pass tax free. Tax would be
assessed only after the taxpayer fully used the unified credit. See id. §§ 2010,2055.
0° See, e.g., J. PRICE,' CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 263-70 (1983); Backman & Frank, Five
Factors to Consider in Determining How Much of the Unlimited Marital Deduction to Use, 9 EST. PLAN. 194
(1982); Smith, Unlimited Marital Deduction Increases Planning Flexibility and Triggers Redrafting, 8 EST.
PLAN. 336 (1981).
"1 But see Smith, supra note 60, at 337-39.
!ACC. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (1982).
"Id. at § 2041(2). Powers created on or before October 21,1942, are subject to different rules.
Id. at 2041(1).
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clients." Lawyers following such a doctrine would be less able to assume that their clients
would prefer a particular approach.
A similar set of problems arises regarding discussions of planning options available
for clients. Because the choices are virtually unlimited, no lawyer could be expected to
explain them all (let alone imagine them all). Some options are important enough,
however, that lawyers have a duty to mention them as part of giving competent advice.
The informed decisionmaking doctrine would enhance current doctrine by focusing
attention on the need to discuss some options in greater depth.
For example, if a trust is appropriate for a particular client, a further question
which the lawyer and client commonly should discuss is whether the trust should be
testamentary or inter vivos. Most good lawyers would note the relative merits of each in
general terms.65 Other questions may arise, however, depending upon the client. If the
client is naming beneficiaries likely to reside in another state, the lawyer should note the
relative ease of moving an inter vivos, as opposed to a testamentary, trust. 66 If an
unmarried client is involved in a sexual relationship, an inter vivos trust might be an
attractive alternative to a will.° The lawyer would likely not need to discuss either of
these points in full with many clients. An informed decisiontnaking doctrine, however,
should emphasize the duty of the lawyer to learn enough about each client to know
64 Charitable gifts pose similar problems. For example, a properly structured charitable testa-
mentary gift will be deductible from the donor's gross estate. Id. at § 2055. If the will was executed,
however, too close in time to the testator's death, or if the gift is too large, such charitable gifts will
be invalid in some states. For an example of a plan frustrated by such an approach, see Crosby v.
Alton Ochsner Medical Found., 276 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1973). See generally Report of the Committee
on Succession, Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 290 (1970).
Because such restrictions usually apply only to testamentary gifts, however, a client can avoid them '
by using an inter vivos trust. Of course, other considerations may affect the choice of an inter vivos
trust. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
If the charitable gifts would be of non-cash property, other questions could arise. For example,
a gift of art work might or might not carry with it a right to reproduce the item, as when museums
offer to sell prints of their paintings. See generally Berkowitz & Leaffer, Copyright Ce the Art Museum,
8 CoLum. J.L. & ARTS 249, 286-99 (1984) (discussing exclusive rights under copyright law in the
context of works of art). The client should decide whether the gift should include other uses of the
art work.
65 Testamentary trusts tend to be easier to change while the testator is alive, but may be less
flexible later (primarily because court supervision is often required). Inter vivos trusts are somewhat
more cumbersome to establish or amend (because of the need to involve the trustee at that time),
but may be more flexible than a testamentary trust after the settlor has died. Inter vivos trusts are
not subject to probate and its attendant costs. See generally J. DUKEMINIER & S. JoHANsoN, WILLS,
TRusrs, AND ESTATES 516-17 (3d ed. 1984); J. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 1 0-
10.1 1 (1983); T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 197-212 (2d ed.
1979).
Because a testamentary trust is subject to court supervision, any move would require court
approval. That complication can be eliminated if an inter vivos trust is used.. For example, one
circumstance which might be overlooked unless the lawyer asks the right questions involves minor
children. If the contemplated personal guardian for the children resides in another state and the
children will be moving to live with the guardian, the settlor may want to allow the guardian to
remove one trustee and name as successor someone (or some institution) more convenient to the
guardian.
67 See generally Kramer, Estate Planning for the Stable and Not-So-Stable Marriage and Nonmarital
Cohabitation, 39 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. 'FAX'N § 56.07 (1981); Sherman, Undue Influence and the
Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 225 (1981); Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers
Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240 (1980).
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whether such issues could be relevant and the duty to assure that the client understood
the consequences of the choices made.
Another example of planning options involves choices available for the disposition
of property. Most clients probably begin by thinking they should treat each of their
children equally. Not only should lawyers not automatically assume that the client will
prefer equal treatment, but lawyers should also challenge such assumptions by the client.
The lawyer should point out that no two children are the same and that the law does
not require that they be treated the same. Questioning by the lawyer should seek to
uncover whether the differences between the children are substantial enough to call for
consideration of different dispositions. In most cases the client probably will elect equal
division of property, but the decision will not have been fully informed unless some
discussion of the question has taken place."
Lawyers and clients also should explore differences among beneficiaries in the
context of powers to invade a trust corpus. Trusts commonly give trustees the power to
spend the corpus for the "health, education and comfort" of a beneficiary. The lawyer
should ask whether some more specific powers would be appropriate. Is one child likely
to need funds to start her own business? Is another likely to need a down-payment for
a house? Is a third likely to abuse grants for education? Only by inquiring about the
family, and suggesting various ideas, can the lawyer be sure the client fully appreciates
the flexibility available. One object of such an open-ended discussion would be to elicit
a client question like, "Could I do this?" The answer likely will be "yes," and the idea
likely never would have arisen if the lawyer had not stimulated the client's thinking. 65
By encouraging more complete discussions between lawyers and clients, the in-
formed decisionmaking doctrine could greatly enhance the chances that clients really
have formed the specific intention to mean what a document says. In particular, one of
the most troublesome problems regarding the interpretation of documents is the courts'
tendency to pretend that testators (or others) actually understood the legal meaning of
the words used.7° Clearly, not all clients will fully understand all of their documents. Just
as clearly, clients could understand more if lawyers made a greater effort to explain in
more detaiLn
" A similar problem may arise for a client who is informed that a trustee may be given the
discretion to "sprinkle" income among beneficiaries. While the trustee would have the power to act,
he or she would probably want to consult the beneficiaries regarding their needs and preferences.
If the senior left both children and grandchildren (children of predeceased children), the trustee
may have trouble deciding how to weigh the reasonable claims of all. For a discussion of options
which a lawyer ought to raise with a client considering sprinkle provisions, see Halbach, Issues About
Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L. REV. 333, 355-57 (1983).
Lawyers also ought to consider out-of-the-ordinary dispositions when designing a special power
of appointment. A trust often gives surviving spouses power to appoint the remainder of a trust
"among our children" or, more flexibly, "among our descendents." A client, if told it is possible,
might also want to include the spouses of descendents as possible takers. if a child has predeceased
his or her surviving parent, leaving a spouse and minor children, perhaps a gift to the spouse,
instead of to the minor children, would be sensible. Some clients would know that under no
circumstances would they want such a distribution. Others might want to preserve the option. Only
by engaging in a fully-informed discussion can clients decide.
For a discussion of such brainstorming in a negotiation context, see Gifford, Tice Synthesis of
Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context,
39 UCLA L. REv. No. 3 (1987).
" See Proctor, 263 Mass. at 8, 160 N.E. at 493 (quoted supra note 1).
7 ' See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 585. Noting that tax problems can arise from the
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The question of how much a lawyer should discuss under the relevance standard is
particularly troublesome when the potential topics involve "boilerplate," that is, language
which tends to appear repeatedly in different documents of the same type. Once in a
lawyer's forms, boilerplate seems to take on a life of its own. The meanings of many
terms are obscure, but because the words (if not their meanings) are so familiar to the
lawyer, they often go unexplained to the client. Surely the cost of legal advice would rise
dramatically if every client had to understand the implications of every word in every
document. Lawyers ill-serve their clients, however, by broadly defining what explanations
are too trivial to raise with a client. The result is worse than an inadequately-informed
decision; it is adoption of language without a decision. A standard of "relevance" can
set the bounds of appropriate discussions. Lawyers should always consider relevant the
meanings of terms used in the document. The doctrine of informed decisionmaking
would not require discussions of other possible word choices unless the client's situation
indicated the particular relevance of extended discussion. Clients should know, however,
what the words mean, and the doctrine should require lawyers to evaluate when clients
might want to know more.
For clarity and efficiency, estate planners often insert boilerplate definitions in wills
and trust agreements. A particular definition can affect who qualify as beneficiaries or
what their rights are. For example, a will might define "descendants" to mean "lawful
descendants, whether natural or adopted." Such a definition would disinherit all children
of unmarried parents. Perhaps the client would not want to disinherit his or her son's
children resulting from a living-together relationship." The lawyer should raise the
question. Further, such a definition might well allow the son to include his lover as a
beneficiary by adopting her." Perhaps the client would prefer to recognize an adoption
only if it occurred while the adoptee was a minor." The client is unlikely to identify the
problem without advice from the lawyer.
Complete discussion of other definitions, even ones which affect distributions, may
be beyond the scope of an informed decisionmaking duty. They may deal with possibil-
ities so remote as not to warrant elaboration. For example, many clients will want their
estates distributed "per stirpes," more easily understood if called "by right of represen-
tation." Lawyers should explain to clients the difference between that approach and a
"per capita" distribution." If a client adopts a "representation" approach, another prob-
lem arises. In cases involving survivors two and three generations below the testator,
courts have disagreed on the meaning of' "right of representation."' 6 Lawyers can solve
insertion of boilerplate, the authors add: "Isluch provisions are so trivial that their inclusion would
seldom even be brought to the testator's attention by his lawyer; they are not, in other words, the
product of the testator's particularized instruction to the lawyer." See also Schwartz, Whose Wealth Is
It Anyway? Impediments to the Realization of an Owner's Plan of Disposition, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 671, 672-
73 (1983) (calling for empirical research as to whether clients understand their estate plans). Cf.
Connecticut Jr. Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 188 Conn. 1, 11, 448 A.2d 190, 195 (1982) ("How often
is it, that the words used by the scrivener convey a different estate from what the testator designed1").
72 See Halbach, supra note 68, at 343-50.
73 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (1982) (adoption creates parent-child relationship
"for all purposes, including ... applicability of ... documents ... .").
r See Halbach, supra note 68, at 335-43, 347-50.
75 See infra note 146 for an example of different shares under per capita and per stirpes
distribution.
76 One construction is to divide the estate into as many shares as there were children of the
testator. See Lombardi v. Blois, 230 Cal. App. 2d 191, 40 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1964). Another possibility
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this problem, however, by drafting a definition of right of representation." Especially if
a trust is designed to last for a long time, it should contain a definition as a way of
avoiding litigation; the lawyer should explain the definition and tell the client that the
definition represents one possible approach. A lawyer should not have a further duty,
however, to explain other alternatives. If the proposed definition does not seem appro-
priate to the client and the lawyer has informed the client that alternatives are available,
the client should have the burden of carrying the discussion further.
In addition to explaining the definitions they propose, lawyers should avoid the
temptation not to discuss other common provisions. For example, many clients will want
to protect their trust beneficiaries from themselves by inserting into the trust "spendth-
rift" clauses of various types. The basic purpose, of such a clause is to protect the
beneficiary's share from creditors.'" Even lawyers who bother to mention the clause may
i n
limit their explanation to saying, "It's there to protect against creditors." Lawyers should
also tell Clients that the price of such protection may be to prohibit beneficiaries from
transferring their shares to more needy beneficiaries" or terminating the trust early.'T
Other implications of sPen'dihrift clauses would be relevant only to pa-rtiCtilar
For example, such clauses may not protect a beneficiary's share from claims for child '
support or alimony.'" As a general rule, it would not seem necessary to raise ;deli an
exception with a client. If any of the client's beneficiaries were divorced and making
such payments, however, the lawyer and client should discuss the point. Andther
involves state claims for a disabled beneficiary's support; a court might or might not
allow such claims against the trust.' 12 In most cases, that risk would not be worth
If the client had a disabled beneficiary, however, or expressed concerns regarding future
disability, informed decisionmaking would require a good deal of additional discussion."
is to divide the estate at the first generation level which left survivors. See Balch v. Stone, 149 Masi.
39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889).
"See e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (1982), which reads
If representation is called for ... the estate is divided into as many shares as there are
surviving heirs in the nearest degree of kinship and deceased persons in the same
degree who left issue who survive the decedent, each surviving heir in the nearest
degree receiving one share and the share of each deceased person in the same degree
being divided among his issue in the same manner.
For aritither approach, see Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for
Intestate Ilistiibutibit Among Descendants. 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 626 (1971).
1" See generally 2 A. ScOrr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 151-58 (1967).
79 In one case ; spendthrift provisions almost prohibited the testator's sons from using their
interests to benefit their aged mother. The sons had to go to the expense of getting a court order
allowing invasion of the principal. See In re Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948). If all of the
beneficiaries had not agreed on that approach, the mother might have been left without a remedy.
See Ili re Van Deusen's Estate, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 182 P.2d 565 (1947),
8U Of course, prohibition of early termination may be exactly what the testator would prefer, if
given the information. See ; e.g., Heritage Bank — North, N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 164
NJ. Super. 33, 395 A.2t1 552 (1978) (early termination denied where lawyer inserted spendthrift
clause in response to client concerns that beneficiary would dissipate her estate).
81 Compare Shelley Shelley, 223 Or. 328, 354 P.2d 282 (1960) with In re Campbell's Trusts,
258 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1977).
82 Compare Dept of Mental Health v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 104 III. App. 3d 461, 432
N.E.2d 1086 (1982) (allowing the state claim) with In re Gross, 52 N.Y.2d 1006, 420 N.E.2d 91
(1981) (protecting the trust).
89 See Massey, Protecting the Menially Incompetent Child's Trust Interest from State Reimbursement
Claims, 581JE.N. L. J. 557 (1981).
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The lawyer's duty under an informed decisionmaking doctrine would be to learn enough
about the client to be able to draw appropriate boundaries for their discussions. 84
In sum, a lawyer representing a client should discuss whatever is relevant to that
client. Under a relevance standard, a lawyer bears a heavy burden of at least initially
raising topics with the client. If a lawyer identifies particular client needs, informed
decisionmaking may require further discussions. In order to aid their clients' understand-
ing, and at the same time protect themselves against claims that clients acted without
advice, many lawyers will want to develop methods of preserving evidence of their
disclosures and their clients' comprehension."
" A few additional examples support the point. A forfeiture-type spendthrift provision attached
to a surviving spouse's income interest would disqualify the trust for the marital deduction, because
the spouse could not be sure of getting all the income. See I.R.C. 2056(b) (1982), as amended in
1984. Langbein and Waggoner have labeled such provisions "trivial" and have noted "their inclusion
would seldom even be brought to the testator's attention by his lawyer ...." See Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 5, at 585. Whether the lawyer and client ought to discuss these provisions
depends upon the client. A client for whom tax savings is a major goal presumably would not want
to forego the savings for the particular form of spendthrift protection. On the other hand, if the
client expresses concern for the spending habits of the spouse, the parties should discuss the question
of how the trust might restrain those habits and what the tax consequences might be.
The same authors raise another example which they suggest is too trivial for discussion:
the omission from a charitable remainder annuity trust or unitrust of . . . a power in
the trustee to name a qualified charitable organization as the remainderman if the
charity designated in the trust instrument is no longer a qualified charitable organi-
zation at the time that the remainder is to become possessory disqualifies the remainder
interest for the charitable deduction.
Id. (citation omitted). One can imagine a testator who would be unwilling to give such a power to
the trustee if the testator were particularly wedded to the charity. Rather than not raise the issue,
the lawyer ought to mention the restriction and thereby shift the burden to the client to object.
Perhaps the least often reviewed of boilerplate provisions are those involving trustee powers.
Even here, preliminary explanations are warranted, and they may reveal a need for more detailed
discussions. Most forms will provide wide-ranging investment powers for the trustee. Before a client
signs such a document, however, the client ought to have an opportunity to say, "1 want to preclude
my trustee from investing in X." Documents often give trustees the power to retain property,
"however acquired." If the client contemplates a corporate trustee, the client should be aware that
a court may read a power to retain property as waiver of any objection to the trustee holding its
own stock. See In re Will of Heidenreich, 85 Misc. 2d 135, 378 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct.
1976).
Another common provision is a "severability clause," which says that if any particular provision
fails, the rest of the document is still to stand. Most testators would prefer such an approach. For
some, however, the plan might "hang together" so closely that the testator would view disruption
of any part as worse than total invalidity. The client should have a chance to make that choice. Cf.
J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 872 (4th ed. 1942), in which Gray criticizes Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891), which reformed a document that otherwise would have
violated the rule. Professor Gray notes that the court may have given property to persons the
testator never meant to benefit. Perhaps the testator would have preferred invalidity to the court's
choice of validity of benefits to an expanded class.
Of course, if the lawyer fails to engage in the discussions recommended here, reformation of
the document might be an appropriate remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 160-85.
85 Even lawyers who ultimately clear themselves of charges of inadequate disclosure would have
been better off if they had preserved some evidence. See, e.g., In re Shear, 72 N.J. 474, 371 A.2d
282, (1977) (attorney reprimanded for failure to obtain client's consent to changes in contract;
changes never confirmed in writing); In re Conduct of Bevans, 298 Or. 583, 695 P.2d 41 (1985)
(evidence that attorney made insufficient disclosure of conflict of interest did not meet "clear and
convincing" standard). cf. Heritage Bank — North, N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 164 N.J.
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C. Preserving Evidence of Disclosure and Understanding
A variety of methods are available for recording what information was discussed
with a particular client and whether the client understood it. Lawyers certainly are
accustomed to writing memos "for the file" to explain their actions and self-serving
letters to each other and to clients." While such documentation might be useful in an
informed decisionmaking context, a method which actively involves the client is likely to
be more credible. One approach would be to borrow from doctors, who have had
extensive, if uneven, experience with informed consent forms. 87 An alternative to having
clients sign prepared forms would be to ask them to write out or dictate statements in
their own words. 88 Lawyers might make audio or video tapes of the client conferences
unless they would interfere with the lawyer's effort to establish rapport with the client."
In any event, the lawyer ought to select the method most suitable to the particular
circumstances.
Which approach, or combination of approaches is appropriate will depend primarily
upon three factors: the sophistication of the client, the nature of the lawyer-client
relationship," and the legal problems being resolved. The needs of both the lawyer, for
protection, and the client, for information, are relevant. A lawyer serving a sophisticated,
long-term client with a relatively straightforward problem might do well with a simple
prepared form.9 ' On the other hand, a videotape of conversations might be appropriate
Super. 33, 395 A.2d 552 (1978) (court concluded that client intended to include spendthrift clause,
even though lawyer could nut recall either reading or explaining the clause to the client).
"" See Avery, Is it Safe to Be An Estate Planner?", 16 L. OFF. ECON. & Moser. 240, 243 (1975);
Johnston, supra note 28, at 675 0.185 (noting the common practice of sending "closing letters" to
clients after a will has been drafted). From the perspective of fostering an informed decisionmaking
process, however, the closing letter comes too late unless it accurately reflects what the lawyer and
client discussed during the planning stages.
87 See Andrews, supra note 8, at 180-82; Miller & Willner, The Two Part Consent Form: A Suggestion
For Promoting Free and Informed Consent, 290 NEW ENC. J. Men. 964 (1974); Morrow, How Readable
Are Subject Consent Forms?, 244 J. A.M.A, 56 (1980).
"" See Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REv. 87, 91-93 (1958).
89 See Beyer, Video Requiem: Thy Will Be Done, 124 Tr. & Est. 24 ( July, 1985); Beyer, Videotaping
the Will Execution Ceremony — Preventing Frustration of the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J.
I (1983); Buckley & Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 Onto N.U.L.
REV. 271 (1984); Nash, A Videowill: Safe & Sure, 70 A.B.A. J. 87 (Oct, 1984). In one recent case,
audio tapes made of a will execution ceremony were crucial to the court's rejecting an undue
influence challenge. Green v, Jones, 254 Ga. 35, 326 S.E.2d 448 (1985). If tapes are not admissible
into evidence in local courts, they will not offer as much protection to the lawyer. See American
Bar Association, Videotape Evidence in the Courts — 1983, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 453 (1985). See also FED. R.
EVID. 1001(2).
99 Because client understanding is particularly important in conflict of interest situations, com-
plete documentation of the lawyer's disclosures and clients' consent should be the norm.
" In the context of an ongoing lawyer-client relationship, it ought to he possible for the lawyer
and client to engage in a dialogue which would consider the consequences of a variety of routine
matters. Once the client had been able to make informed decisions on the appropriate approaches
to take, the doctrine proposed here would not require further consultations unless something out
of the ordinary arose. In order to protect both the lawyer and the client, any form should carefully
define the scope of the lawyer's authority to act without further consultation.
Waivers provide another approach to avoiding the repetitiveness which would characterize
continuing disclosures in an ongoing relationship. See Martyn, supra note 3, at 351. In order to
make a knowing waiver, however, the lawyer would have had to inform the client of the conse-
quences of the waiver, A theory of broad disclosures to cover routine matters thus seems more
straightforward than a theory allowing waivers.
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with an unsophisticated client in need of a will. If the video equipment proved intimi-
dating to the client, a lawyer might use an audio tape. Lawyers might devise forms to
cover "routine" matters, 92 but should treat forms with special care. Their use might
encourage the natural tendency to classify clients and their needs without conducting a
real dialogue with each client. Further, forms lack flexibility, while a planning practice
necessarily requires consideration of a variety of options in a variety of combinations.
Also, the use of forms tends to exacerbate language problems." One luxury of a planning
practice is that time is usually available before a decision is needed. Lawyers should use
this time to facilitate client comprehension; clients should be able to "sleep on it" before
making decisions.• Finally, lawyers should structure the disclosure process to allow,
indeed force, continuing interchange between lawyer and client.
If the lawyer has preserved reliable evidence of' disclosure and client comprehension,
this evidence ought to establish a presumption that the lawyer has given the client an
opportunity to make an informed decision." In order to recover in a later malpractice
action, courts would then require plaintiffs to challenge the authenticity of the evidence.
Similarly, if a client brought an ethics complaint against the attorney, the evidence would
carry a presumption of proper conduct. Finally, if a lawyer sought reformation of
documents, this evidence would be persuasive evidence of what the client intended.
The informed decisionmaking doctrine developed here builds upon the solid base
of disclosure requirements applicable in conflict of interest situations. The doctrine
further recognizes that unless clients and lawyers discuss topics relevant to each individ-
ual client, lawyers will continue to make decisions properly belonging to clients. Accord-
ingly, remedies should be available to persons harmed when lawyers breach the duty to
engage in informed decisionmaking.
92 If lawyers use paralegals for handling "routine" matters, they also should be involved in the
information-giving process. Lawyers may be held liable for the mistakes of their employees. See
generally Wade, Tart Liability of Paralegals and Lawyers Who Utilize Their Services, 24 VAND. L. REV.
1133 (1971).
SI Whatever method of disclosure and preservation of evidence the laywer adopts, the language
used should facilitate, rather than impede, communication. Attention to some basic guidelines can
pay significant dividends in terms of client understanding. First, discussions ought to be in the
native tongue of the client. In addition, lawyers should use short sentences and avoid technical
language. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 399-436 (1963); R.C. WYDICK, PLAIN
ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 31-35,49-57 (2d ed. 1985). See also, Andrews, supra note 8, at 182-86.
Furthermore, lawyers ought to give broad definition to what are "technical" terms. "Per stirpes"
seems to call out for explanation, but a client might be equally uninformed about what the innocent-
sounding phrase "power of appointment" means. Because lawyers frequently use technical language
with each other, they often find it difficult to distinguish between what is familiar language to them
and what is likely to be familiar to the client. See also supra text following note 71 (discussing the
use of boilerplate language). If the lawyer can quantify risks, they ought to be stated in percentage
terms, rather than merely categorized as "significant" or "negligible." The lawyer must take care to
present neutral explanations. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 182-83. See generally D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, supra note 11, at 156-91; Andrews, supra note 8, at 184-204; Comment, Informed Consent,
supra note 31, at 192-95.
" See Andrews, supra note 8, at 199 n.192.
" Martyn's model statute would allow a signed writing which meets specific requirements
regarding content. The written consent form would establish a presumption in favor of the lawyer,
but be subject to challenge in a number of specified circumstances. See Martyn, supra note 3, at
346-47. Because the best method of preserving evidence of lawyer disclosure and client under-
standing might be authentic audio or video tapes, these ought to carry similar weight.
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III. REMEDIES
Two categories of remedies ought to be available if a lawyer fails to engage in
informed decisionmaking. In some cases the law should direct sanctions at the lawyer;
they might take the form either of professional disciplinary actions for professional
ethics violations or of successful malpractice actions. A second approach would focus on
reforming documents prepared in the absence of' adequate information.
A. Actions Against Lawyers
1. Ethics Violations
The new emphasis on the client in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct from
the American Bar Association provides one vehicle both for alerting lawyers to the need
for meaningful communication with clients and for disciplining lawyers who fail to
comply with the appropriate standard. 99 The rules take significant steps toward estab-
lishing an informed decisionmaking doctrine. In particular, for the first time in the
evolution of lawyer's professional standards, a professional regulation expressly requires
lawyer-client communication. The vehicle is Rule 1.4, which in part (b) requires a lawyer
to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." 97 The standard proposed in this ar-
ticle, requiring lawyers to discuss topics relevant to each individual client, should be
viewed as the way "to permit the client to make informed decisions." 9" Like this article,
9° MRPC (Final Draft 1983). Professional organizations may become involved in encouraging
informed decisionmaking in other ways. A peer review system could encourage it. See The American
Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education, A Model
Peer Review System 17-18 (Discussion Draft, April 15, 1980). The American Law Institute's forth-
coming RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS may also address the issue,
97 MRPC Rule 1.4(b), One commentator has described the rule appropriately as "the legal
professions' regulatory counterpart to the medical informed consent doctrine." Maute, supra note
li, at 1062. For other commentary on the Model Rules in this context, see Spiegel, The New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the
Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.'1003.
Only a half-step away from the locus of the present article is the injunction in MPRC Rule
1.4(a): "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information."
99
 The official comments to MPRC Rule 1.4 provide some guidance on the nature of the
communication requirement. The rule does not require detailed explanation of trial or negotiation
tactics, but a lawyer should review "all important provisions" to a negotiation with the client. MRPC
Rule 1.4 comment. Cf. Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 696 P,2d 645, 212 Cal. Rptr.
151 (1985) (client not bound by arbitration agreement signed by lawyer on behalf of client, where
lawyer lacked authority to enter agreement). Presumably the review requirements would apply to
estate and business plans as well.
The rule's requirement that the lawyer explain the matter "to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions" seems to adopt a subjective standard for measuring
the adequacy of the information disclosed. In contrast, the comment, though not entirely clear,
appears to set a "reasonable client" standard. See MRPC Rule 1.4 comment ("Ordinarily, the
information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible
adult."). For commentary on some of the conflict inherent in the comments, see Spiegel, supra note
97, at 1005-07. As noted in the text, the subjective standard is preferable. See supra notes 26-31
and accompanying text.
The MRPC Rule 1,4 comment recognizes both the utility of a system of limited reporting for
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the model rules recognize that the doctrine's appropriate scope will vary according to
the circumstances. 99 Other rules, 1 °9 particularly those involving conflict of interest situ-
ations,"' support the policy of 1.4(b).
The lawyer disciplinary system can help inform lawyers that traditional approaches
of leaving decisions to the lawyer are no longer appropriate. Rule 1.4 and its associated
rules are broad, covering situations which might fall between the cracks of other sanc-
tions.'" Because of the wide discretion usually available to disciplinary bodies regarding
imposition of sanctions,'" however, those bodies should be particularly careful not to
use the informed decisionmaking doctrine to harass unpopular, but competent, members
of the bar.'"
History suggests that lawyer discipline is largely restricted to a relatively few "serious"
cases.'" Also, the professional regulation system usually does not compensate harmed
some clients and the need for accommodations in emergency situations. MRPC Rule 1.4 comment.
See also supra notes 21 and 91.
"9
 The comment to the rule notes lajdequacy of communication depends in part on the kind
of advice or assistance involved." MRPC Rule 1.4 comment.
1 °° See MRPC Rules 1.1 (lawyer competence), 1.2(a) (lawyer shall abide by client's decisions,
with exceptions), I.2(c) ("[al lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation"), and 1.5(b) (lawyer shall communicate fee in writing).
101 See MRPC Rules 1.7(a)(2), I.7(b)(2), 1.8(a)(3), 1.8(b), I.8(f)(1), 1.8(g), I.8(i), 1.9(a), 1.10(d),
I .11(a), 1.12(a), 1.13(e), 2.2(a)(1), 2.3(a)(2) (requiring client consent after consultation in a variety
of situations).
102
 For example, discipline might still be appropriate if damages are too small to justify the
effort of litigation on a malpractice theory. This problem can be alleviated to some extent if the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing the malpractice action are recoverable in that action.
See Martyn, supra note 3, at 349-50. But see, e.g., McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090, 1093-94 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1977) (attorneys' fees incurred pursuing subsequent malpractice action not recoverable);
Stinson v. Feminist Womens' Health Center, 416 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (attorneys'
fees in subsequent malpractice action are not recoverable as damages); Erving's Hatcheries v.
Thompson, 204 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1967) (contingent attorneys' fees not allowed as damages in the
malpractice action). See also infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. Of course, attorneys' fees
paid for the legal services in which the breach occurred ought to be recoverable as part of the
damages suffered as a consequence of the inadequate representation. See Spering v. Sullivan, 361
F. Supp. 282 (D. Del. 1973); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201-02, 491 P.2d 433, 437, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 853 (1971); Winter v. Brown, 365 A.2d 381, 386 (D.C. 1976); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins, Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972); Hoekstre v. Golden B. Products, 77 Or. App.
104, 712 P.2d 149 (1985).
1 °3
 A wide range of sanctions is and ought to be available. See A.B.A. Standards for Lawyer
Discipline and Disability Proceedings, Standard 6 (1979) (dispositions and sanctions). The A.B.A.
standard gives discretion to disciplinary bodies, however, which is often very broad: "(tlhe discipline
to be imposed should depend upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case, should be
fashioned in light of the purpose of lawyer discipline, and may take into account aggravating or
mitigating circumstances." Id. at Standard 7.1. For recent commentary on the status of lawyer
disciplinary efforts, see McPike & Harrison, The True Story of Lawyer Discipline, 70 A.B.A. J. Sept.
1984, at 92.
'° On the question of abuse of the lawyer discipline system, see generally Martyn, Lawyer
Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar? 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 720-22 (1981) (citing numerous
authorities and expressing concern that the profession has singled out "attorneys who hold unpo-
pular beliefs, represent unpopular clients, or who have marginal incomes" for discipline).
1 °5 See id. at 718-19; Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 546-
50 (1985); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J . 917, 979-99. But cf. Maute, supra note 11, at 1050 n.2 (stating a preference for direct self-
regulation by the profession).
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parties.'" Thus, in most cases, courts should also consider breach of the duties imposed
by an informed decisionmaking doctrine to be legal malpractice. 10
2. Malpractice Liability
As noted earlier, some writers have proposed that the law impose malpractice liability
upon lawyers who breach an informed consent doctrine. 108 Problems arise, however,
when applying malpractice doctrine in a planning context. Difficult causation questions
arise for the claimant in a malpractice action if the client has died or if third parties are
involved. Third parties can also complicate the claimant's establishing damages. Further,
conflict of interest situations call for separate treatment regarding damages. Finally, if
informed decisionmaking is to be a viable doctrine for a planning practice, courts and
legislatures should revise traditional defenses regarding privity and statutes of limitation.
Traditionally, plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions have had to show not only that
their lawyers made mistakes, but that the mistakes harmed the plaintiffs.'m In the context
of litigation mistakes, proof of these elements has often required a "suit within a suit"
in which the client effectively retries the original claim to establish that he or she would
have prevailed in the first lawsuit but for the lawyer's mistake there."0 Where planning
has been involved, plaintiffs have had to establish that the mistake caused tangible loss,
like higher taxes, 11 ' a share of their mother's estate," 2 or loss of a job.'u'
A traditional malpractice law approach to informed decisionmaking would require
a plaintiff to establish a causal connection between the lawyer's failure to provide ade-
106 Some jurisdictions have established funds to repay clients whose lawyers have stolen their
funds, but compensation for other harms is left to civil law. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 6140.5 (West 1974); MAss. SUP. jun. CT. R. 4,03-4.06 (1986).
105 The question of whether violation of professional ethical standards should create any pre-
sumption of malpractice is subject to dispute. The Model Rules explicitly note that the rules "are
not designed to be a basis for civil liability." MRPC, preamble. Professor Peck predicts that "[t]he
attempt [lo avoid malpractice liability will almost certainly fail in light of the generally accepted
proposition that members of a profession are under an obligation ... to exercise at least the normal
skills, ability, and competence of that profession." Peck, supra note 4, at 1291. See also Lipton v.
Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981) (violation of Code of Professional Responsibility
is rebuttable evidence of malpractice).
108 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
1 " See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Spering v. Sullivan, 361 F.
Supp. 282 (D.C. Del. 1973); Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
Li" See, e.g., Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1978); Togstad v, Vesely,
Otto, Miller, & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980); Ortiz v. Barren, 222 Va. 118, 278 S.E.2d 833
(1981); Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . . A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1958). Recent
authority, however, undercuts the suit-within-a-suit approach. In a medical malpractice case, a court
allowed a plaintiff to prove that the malpractice reduced the patient's survival chances, rather than
requiring the plaintiff to show that the patient would have survived if treated properly. I-lerskovits
v. Group Health Co-op, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). See also King, Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE
L.J. 1353 (1981).
For the view that lawyers should be liable for the settlement value of bungled cases, see Peck,
supra note 4, at 1300. See also, Spiegel, supra note 4, at 137-38.
111 See, e,g., Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal, 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
113 See, e.g., Kushner v. McLarty, 165 Ga. App. 400, 300 S.E.2d 531 (1983).
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quate information and the plaintiff's harm." 4 In particular, a plaintiff would need to
prove that the lawyer failed to discuss a topic relevant to the individual client; that the
client, if adequately informed, would have acted differently; and that the plaintiff would
have been better off under the "new" approach. As noted earlier,° because conflicts of
interest so threaten the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship, if a plaintiff establishes
a breach regarding disclosures of conflicts, the court should presume harm. Otherwise,
plaintiffs must prove they would have fared better if there had been adequate disclosure.
The causation requirement poses two sets of significant proof problems in a planning
context. First, much of the evidence available to establish answers to hypothetical ques-
tions will be of questionable reliability. The client may well be dead at the time the
question arises." 6 Second, if more than one party is involved, it may be very difficult to
determine whether the parties would have followed a different course had they been
adequately informed. A completed deal might have collapsed; a deal which fell apart
might have been completed.
One approach to controlling false or frivolous claims would be to require plaintiffs,
in appropriate cases, to establish by clear and convincing evidence the causal connection
between the inadequate disclosure and their harm. Courts regularly use a "clear and
convincing" standard to discourage frivolous claims by making recovery less likely. For
example, courts often apply that standard to a plaintiff claiming under a contract to
make a will,'" seeking to impose a constructive trust upon a will," 6 or trying to reform
a contract within the Statute of Frauds. 1 ' 6 Applying a clear and convincing standard in
all informed decisionmaking cases would be inconsistent with the mainstream of civil
law, whiCh typically requires only a preponderance of the evidence, and would substan-
tially undercut the deterrence value of the informed decisionmaking doctrine. The clear
and convincing standard, however, is appropriate in situations which present substantial
risks of fraudulent claims.
Therefore, courts should subject a plaintiff to the clear and convincing standard of
proof in those situations where recovery from the lawyer would place the plaintiff in
substantially the same position as if the plaintiff had recovered in a direct action requiring
14 See Martyn, supra note 3, at 346 (proposing model statute which requires "that the undis-
closed information, if disclosed, would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances, have
changed the client's choice"). Professor Martyn's language calls for a subjective test. See id. at 398-
49. For a discussion of the subjective and objective tests, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying
text.
The medical malpractice cases also require a judgment about whether the information would
have changed the patient's (or a reasonable patient's) mind. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91
(discussing which standard to apply and adopting an objective test). See generally Andrews, supra
note 8, at 176-77.
" 5 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
116 Extrinsic evidence would be required. Important evidence might include the lawyer's testi-
mony about how the client responded to various explanations which the lawyer made during
representation. Froni those reactions, it might be possible to anticipate how the client would have
responded to the undisclosed information. The death of the client is likely to erase any claim that
the client's statements are inadmissable because privileged. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 99 (3d
ed. 1989).
117 See 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 10.93, at 528-32 (1960).
''" See 5 A. Ron•, THE LAW OE TRUSTS 462.6 (1967).
"9 See J. CAL.AMARI & J. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-31 (2d ed. 1977). See also Langbein
& Waggoner, supra note 5, at 578-79 (advocating a clear and convincing standard for the refor-
mation of wills for mistake).
March 1987]	 INFORMED DECISIONMAKING	 251
the higher standard of proof. For example, in Ogle v. Fruiten 12° the court held that
nephews of a decedent stated a malpractice cause of action against the lawyer who
drafted their uncle's will. The will required the uncle's spouse to survive by 30 days in
order to take and made an alternative gift to the nephews, conditioned on both spouses
dying in a common disaster. When the uncle's spouse died of separate causes 15 days
after the uncle, the property went to the intestate heirs, instead of the nephews, since
the will did not cover the event which happened. 121 If the nephews were able to recover
against the lawyer, they would be in substantially the same position as if the court had
reformed the will to give them the property. 122 Because a clear and convincing standard
of proof ought to be required in any reformation action,'" that standard ought also to
apply in the malpractice action which places the plaintiffslin the same position. Moreover,
such a case typically will involve answering a hypothetical "what would you have done if
you had known?" question. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof,
claimants would be tempted to stretch the truth and say, "I would have demanded a
different contract term" or "Uncle Charlie would have given the property to me :1124
Requiring clear and convincing evidence in such cases would encourage informed de-
cisionmaking while protecting lawyers from abuse of the doctrine.
The presence of other parties to a transaction also affects the analysis. A lawyer
who admits to having failed to inform a client of significant information might nonethe-
less argue that the non-disclosure was irrelevant because it had no effect on the outcome.
Even if the client had known more and wanted other terms, the lawyer argues, the other
parties would not have agreed. If that were the case, and conflicts of interest were not
involved, the plaintiff ought not to prevail. On the other hand, what was significant to
the client might not have been significant to the others.125 If that were the case, the other
parties might well have agreed to new terms proposed by a fully-informed client. Then
malpractice law should subject the lawyer to liability.
If courts required plaintiffs to establish how other parties to a transaction would
have reacted, however, lawyers often would escape liability even if they failed to engage
in informed decisionmaking. Because the doctrine seeks to encourage useful dialogues
between lawyers and clients, lawyers should have the burden of establishing that the
other parties would not have agreed with the client.' 26 A plaintiff should have the initial
12" 102 III. 2d 356,80 111. Dec. 772,466 N.E,2d 224 (1984).
' 21 In re Estate of Smith, 68 III. App. 3d 30,385 N.E.2d 363 (1979).
122 The cases are not exactly the same. For example, reforming a will for mistake could involve
taking the property from named beneficiaries and giving it to unnamed claimants. Recovery by
those claimants in the malpractice action would not affect the rights of the named beneficiaries;
rather, the recovery would remedy the claimants' harm at the expense of the lawyer. See Langbein
& Waggoner, supra note 5, at 589.
122 For a discussion of the reformation remedy, see infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text.
12, Langbein and Waggoner would protect against this sort of claim in a will refor-
mation context by requiring that the plaintiff make the claim with particularity. They would also
require clear and convincing evidence. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 578-79.
122 Cf. R. FISHER & W. Utur, CErritic To YES 41-57 (1981) (distinguishing between positions
taken and interests pursued). The authors illustrate their point by describing two persons arguing
whether to close a window, One wants fresh air; the other wants to avoid a draft. When the persons
see the window's position as a means to an end, instead of the end itself, a solution (an open window
in another room) which meets both interests is possible. Id. at 41. In any multiparty transaction
there are likely to be some terms of significant importance to some parties, but not to others; the
whole group may well accept some items significant to each party.
' 26 Courts have used the device of shifting the burden of proof in other lawyer-disclosure
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burden to prove that the lawyer failed to discuss a topic relevant to the client and that
the fully-informed client would have proceeded differently. Then, the burden of pro-
duction should shift to the lawyer to establish that the other participants would have
rejected the terms the fully-informed client would have proposed.'"
In a multi-party transaction, an ill-informed client might be harmed in one of two
ways. A transaction might have been completed on different terms than an adequately
informed client would have preferred, or a deal which fell apart might have been
completed. Consider, for example, the situation of a restaurateur who seeks to assure
himself a supply of chickens.' 28 His lawyer, unaware that the client only needs stewing
chickens, drafts an agreement requiring a - supplier to deliver a number of "chickens" at
a particular price. The lawyer does not explain that the term "chickens" might be an
ambiguous term, nor does he inquire further to learn the meaning of "chicken" in the
trade. After the deal is closed, the supplier delivers higher-quality frying or broiling
chickens and the client realizes he has paid more than necessary for the quality of
chicken he needs. The client tries to avoid contract liability, fails,'" and then sues his
lawyer. In a malpractice action against the lawyer, the restauranteur would need to show
that the meaning of "chickens" was relevant to him and that had the lawyer informed
him of its meaning, he would have ordered "stewing chickens" instead, at a lower price.
The burden of production would then shift to the lawyer to establish that lower-priced
stewing chickens were not available and that the restauranteur would have ordered the
expensive chicken rather than no chicken at all."
contexts. See, e.g., Meara v. Hewitt, 455 Pa. 132, 314 A.2d 263 (1974) (conflict of interest); Baker
v. Otto, 180 Md. 53, 22 A.2d 924 (1941) (fraud, undue influence).
Placing the burden of proof on the lawyer in this context is consistent with other situations in
which the party best in a position to establish a point has the burden on that point. Here, the lawyer
will most likely have been active in the negotiations and familiar with the positions of all the parties.
Cf. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.8 (W. Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975) (burden of
proof on bailee to avoid negligence if goods are damaged while in bailee's possession).
Often the lawyer will be able to rely upon a history of dealings between the parties or general
practices in the trade in order to bolster the case that the other parties really would have rejected
the clients' position. See generally U.C.C. § 1-205 (Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-15 (2d ed. 1977); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-3 (1980); Note, Custom and
Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55 Cows& L. REV. 1192
(1955).
' 27 See generally C.C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-47 (1978). Because
a plaintiff armed with a strong presumption might be more likely to make questionable claims, the
more prudent approach in this context would be to leave the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff.
129 This example is an adaptation of the celebrated case of Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S.
Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
( 22 One factor which makes recovery by the restaurateur more difficult is the tendency of courts
to construe agreements against the drafting party. Adoption of an informed decisionmaking doc-
trine is consistent with the rationale for an "against-the-drafter" approach to document interpre-
tation. In each case, the goal is to encourage a fuller discussion of relevant issues. Interpreting
against drafters encourages them to cover more points in the agreement, rather than leave gaps to
be filled later. The more complete draft presumably puts the other party on notice to discuss more
issues. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (Interpretation Against the Draftsman),
comment a ("IThe drafting party] is more likely than the other party to know of uncertainties
of meaning. Indeed, he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later date
what meaning to assert.").
13" For another example, consider a client in a divorce action who agrees to a property settlement
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The presence of an adequately informed client can also mean completion of a
transaction which in fact fell apart. Consider a client planning to establish a new business
with a friend. The friend insists upon a corporate form for the business; the client,
inadequately informed that she could pass tax losses through the corporation under
Subchapter S, 131 insists upon a partnership form so that she can claim business losses on
her personal income tax return.I 32 The deal collapses. In a malpractice claim against her
lawyer, the client establishes that if she had understood the consequences of Subchapter
S election, she would have agreed to the corporate form. The lawyer then has the burden
to show that the other party would not have agreed to'the Subchapter S approach. 133
As the examples illustrate, plaintiffs in informed decisionmaking cases will need to
establish what the client would have done if properly informed. In situations where
recovery from the lawyer would place the plaintiff in substantially the same position as
if the plaintiff had recovered in a direct action requiring clear and convincing evidence,
that higher standard should also apply in the informed decisionmaking action. In mul-
tilateral transactions, proposals of importance to one participant, but not to others, are
likely to be accepted by the others. Consequently, an informed decisionmaking plaintiff
should be favored by a rebuttable presumption that in multilateral situations the other
parties would have accepted the terms the adequately informed client would have pro-
posed.
How best to structure claims for damages is the second major problem posed when
designing an appropriate malpractice action for a planner's' 34 breach of the informed
decisionmaking doctrine. In many situations, courts can readily ascertain damages.'" If
multiple parties are involved, however, there may be some question about whether or
how a project would have been completed if the lawyer had adequately informed one
of the parties. While the question is relevant primarily to determining causation, it has
implications for measuring damages as well. A shift of the burden of proof, analogous
to the approach developed above, is appropriate. Also, special considerations are relevant
without the lawyer informing the client of the possibility of seeking a different appraisal of specific
property. After learning of such an option, the client brings an informed decisionmaking claim
against the lawyer. The client establishes that, if informed of the option, he would have requested
an appraisal, which other evidence shows would have set a higher value for the property. In turn,
the client proves that he would have demanded a property settlement reflecting that higher value.
The lawyer argues that the client has proved no harm because it is impossible to know whether the
former wife would have agreed to such a higher value. Under the approach suggested here the
lawyer would have the burden to show that the former wife would not have agreed. Stare a, Tate
suggests the example. 21 Cal. App. 3d 432,98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1971). In this context, the question
of showing causation ties directly into the question of showing damages. See infra notes 136-37 and
accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 1372(b) (1982).
'" Id. § 1374 (1982) (as amended in 1984).
'” The "lost profits" aspects of this example raise a damages problem discussed infra notes
141-43 and accompanying text.
13' For discussions of the damages question primarily from a litigation perspective, see Martyn,
supra note 3, at '349-59; Spiegel, supra note 4, at 137-38.
15 For example, if an ill-informed client executed a will that included a testamentary trust, but
the client, if fully informed, would have chosen an inter vivos trust, the damages would be the cost
of obtaining a suitable inter vivos trust. This example assumes the client is still alive and could have
a lawyer prepare a new trust agreement. Of course, if the client had died, the situation would be
different. Damages presumably would be the increased Cost of administering a testamentary trust
under the circumstances.
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if a conflict of interest is involved. In such situations attorneys' fees ought to be recov-
erable. Further, lost profits or punitive damages might well be appropriate elements of
damages.
Damages might be difficult to establish because they involve speculation about how
others would have acted in hypothetical situations. As noted above,'" complications arise
in establishing causation if someone other than the ill-informed client is involved: the
other party or parties might have responded differently to an adequately informed
client. Because the evidence needed to establish causation might involve identifying the
amount of the damage, a court might consider the proof problem to be one of damages,
rather than one of causation. If the court takes that approach, appropriate presumptions,
parallel to those discussed regarding causation, ought to be available.
Consider a client interested in selling real estate while retaining a mortgage on the
property."' The deal is closed, but the buyer later defaults. At that time the client
discovers that the mortgage is worthless because it is second in priority to one obtained
by a bank. She argues that she would have demanded a higher price for the property
had she known she was getting only a second mortgage. The requirement that she
establish that the other party would have agreed to the higher price can be considered
a causation question (establishing her harm) or a damages question (considering her
harm established by the loss of the security and the extent of her harm established in
part by the price question). In either case, the lawyer should have the burden of
establishing that the other party would not have agreed to the higher price. Otherwise,
as a practical matter lawyers will be insulated from liability in situations involving multi-
party transactions.
The particular threat that conflicts of interest pose to the lawyer-client relationship
calls for an expanded notion of appropriate elements of "damages." Primarily to en-
courage plaintiffs to bring claims which in the public interest ought to be aired, courts
and legislatures have created exceptions to the general rule against allowing recovery of
the attorneys' fees plaintiffs incur in pursuing their claims.'" Courts can strike a balance
"I' See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
1" Olfe v. Gordon suggests the example. 93 Wis. 2d 173, 286 N.W.2d 573 (1980).
"8 The so-called "American Rule" generally denies attorneys' fees in the malpractice action.
Effectively, they come out of the plaintiffs' recovery for other harms. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (Dail.) 306 (1796). See also First Nat'l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 698 P.2d 5
(1985) (the general rule is that attorneys' fees are not awardable); Stinson v. Feminist Women's
Health Center, 416 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. App. 1982) (it is a fundamental proposition that without
an express statute or contract, attorneys' fees are not recoverable). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 194-204 (1973).
Of course, attorneys' fees incurred because of the representation in which the malpractice
occurred ought to be recoverable. See Kramer v. Emche, 64 Md. App. 27, 42, 494 A.2d 225, 233
(1985) (plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable legal expenses and attorneys' fees caused by the
additional litigation); Hinman, Straub, Pigors & Manning, P.C. v. Broder, 89 A.D.2d 278, 456
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1982) (legal fees caused by the need to retain additional counsel are recoverable);
Wiggin v, Gordon, 115 Misc. 2d 1071, 455 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1982) (former client allowed to recover
attorneys' fees incurred to recover money from previous attorney).
Some "exceptions" to the American Rule have developed. See, e.g., Freedom of Information
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970) (attorneys'
fees awardable for successfully suing agency over failure to comply with statute); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.548(802) (Callaghan 1985) (in appropriate actions such as civil rights actions, a court may award
reasonable attorneys' fees); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315
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in informed decisionmaking cases between encouraging public-interest litigation and
honoring traditional doctrine if' they distinguish conflict of interest circumstances from
other situations."" The law should encourage conflict of interest claims, which redress
harms to the core of the lawyer-client relationship, by allowing attorneys' fees in those
cases."" In more typical circumstances, however, as where a lawyer fails to explain the
differences between testamentary and living trusts, the need for court review is not as
great. Therefore, the law should retain the traditional rule against allowing recovery of
attorneys' fees in these non-conflict situations.
Courts should take a similar approach regarding recognition of damages for lost
profits. Consider again the example of the client who, if adequately informed, would
have insisted upon a Subchapter S designation for a new corporation. The business was
never formed. Even if the other parties would have accepted the Subchapter S approach,
the client will have trouble establishing damages in the form of profits which never were
made.' 4 ' The problem of how much specificity the law should require in such cases has
(1977) ("Private attorney general" theory allows court to award to plaintiffs' their counsel fees after
suit disclosed that California's public school financing system violated the California Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause); Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wash. 2d 911,523 P.2d 15 (1974) (plaintiffs properly
recovered reasonable attorneys' fees under common fund principle after their suit exposed uncon-
stitutional state expenditures).
The question of when to grant such fees and how to structure them, has prompted considerable
commentary over a period of many years. See, e.g., Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the United
States: The Sovereign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. Ray. 177 (1979); Dobbs, Awarding
Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435; Ehrenzweig, Reimburse- .
meat of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV, 792 (1966); Fioretti Convery, Attorneys'
Fees: The Mushrooming Cloud of Litigation, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 943 (1985); Hill, Equal Access to justice
Act — Paving the Way for Legislative Change, 36 CASE W. RES. 50 (1985); Kimble, Attorneys' Fees in
Civil Rights Cases: An Essay on Streamlining the Formulation to Attract General Practitioners, 69 MAIN. L.
REV. 373 (1986); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages,
15 MINN. L. REV, 619 (1931); Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
717 (1976); Comment, Attorney Fees: Slipping from the American Rule Strait jacket, 40 MoN .r. L. REV.
308 (1979).
"9 In order to encourage "the use of the courts as a forum in which to seek and define
standards of performance" for lawyers, one commentator would grant attorneys' fees to plaintiffs
in all legal informed consent cases. Martyn, supra note 3, at 349 (contending "no other alternative
[forum] exists"). The text takes a more cautious approach because I am not convinced that all
informed decisionmaking cases deserve•aspecial" status.
"" Availability of attorneys' fees will be particularly important in encouraging redress to dig-
nitary harm where only nominal damages would be available. See supra text accompanying note 115
and see note 26.
141 The lost profits problem could also arise in an estate planning context. Consider a settlor
who wants to limit the amount of income his widow would receive under a trust, but whom the
lawyer does not inform that such an approach could disqualify the gift for the estate tax marital
deduction. If the estate could establish that the settlor, if informed, would have given the income
to get the deduction, the damages would include the increased taxes which the estate would have
saved. Those damages should be relatively easy to calculate. The widow should also recover,
however, the increased income to which she would have been entitled. In order to set those damages,
the widow would have to estimate the trust earnings over her life expectancy and discount her loss
to present value. The situation in Estate of Mittleman v. Comm'r suggests the example. 552 F.2d 132
(D.C. Cir. 1975) In Mittleman, although a trust did not expressly provide that all income go to the
widow, the court interpreted the document as giving all income and thus qualifying for the marital
deduction. For discussions of Mittleman, see supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text; Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 5, at 552-54,584-85.
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long troubled courts and commentators alike, and courts might deny damages as "spec-
ulative" in the Subchapter S situation. 142
 One expert offers this general observation,
however, regarding damages: "The more important it seems to vindicate a given claim,
the more willing a court may be to accept pretty incomplete evidence on the damages
issue." 143 Courts should apply this principle in conflict of interest situations and allow
damages which in other situations they might deny as "speculative."
In addition, in some rare circumstances, punitive damages will be appropriate in an
informed decisionmaking case. In the words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
"[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."'" While
lawyers may have "evil motives" on some occasions, the more probable circumstance for
assessing punitive damages in an informed decisionmaking case would be an exhibition
of reckless indifference to the rights of others. For example, an attorney also serving as
a trustee might be tempted to invade the trust to cover expenses of beneficiaries, but
direct some of the funds to cover attorneys' fees owed him, without disclosing such use
of funds. 145
Courts should set rules governing damages in informed decisionmaking cases with
reference to the situation in which the breach arises. In most cases, the burden of proof
should stay with the plaintiff and the court should limit damages to that which the
injured client lost. If the breach occurred in the context of a multi-party transaction,
appropriate presumptions ought to aid the plaintiff. If the breach occurred in a conflict
of interest situation, then attorneys' fees would be an appropriate element of damages.
Further, damages for lost profits and punitive damages might be appropriate.
142 See generally D, DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 150-57 (1973); Gruendel,
Economic Loss: Recovery of Damages for Economic or Financial Harm, 16 J. MAR. L. & Com. 568 (1985);
McThenia & Ulrich, A Return to Principles of Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1517 (1983); Comment, 34 DRAKE L. REv. 569 (1985); Note, An Economic Approach to Hadley
v. Baxendale: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, Corp., 62 NEB. L. REV. 157 (1983); Comment, Lost-Profits
Damage Awards under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-708(2), 37 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (1985);
Comment, Lost Profits for the Lost Volume Seller: A Businessperson's Pipe Dream or Entitlement!, 90 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 266 (1983).
143 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 152 (1973).
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
14 ' The activities of Wayne R. Starr, Jr. suggest this example. For a chronicle of events leading
to his removal as fiduciary, assessment of punitive damages, and disbarment, see In re Starr, 538
S.W.2d 334 (Mo. bane. 1976) (disbarred); In re Estate of Gould, 547 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (removed as executor); Gould v. Starr, 558 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. Ct..App. 1977) (removed as
trustee; punitive damages assessed). See also Werschkull v. United Cal. Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 981,
149 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978) (wrongful conduct by pension plan trustee); Bowman v. Doherty, 235
Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (attorney failed to notify his client of the trial date because the client
had not paid his legal fees); Stinson v. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc., 416 So. 2d 1183 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (attorneys overbilled and wrongfully withheld settlement check); Finch v.
Hughes Aircraft, Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867 (1984) (attorney failed to notify corporation
of potential patent restrictions in order to bill the corporation for more work). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-1704 (1983) (allows for double the value of the property embezzled from a decedent or
conservator to be awarded as damages).
Outrageous conduct might also give rise to damages for emotional distress suffered. See Peck,
supra note 4, at 1302.
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In addition, if the law is going to require lawyers in a planning practice to engage
in informed decisionmaking, as a practical matter non-clients harmed by a breach must,
in some circumstances, be able to recover against the lawyer. Under traditional rules,
the lawyer typically relies initially on two defenses when a non-client sues: privity (my
duty is owed only to my client, not to third parties)" 6 and the statute of limitations (the
statute started to run at the time of the execution of the will, for example, rather than
the date of the client's death). 147 Consider the situation of a client seeking a will. Inad-
equately informed about the meaning of the words "per stirpes," the client executes a
will providing for that kind of distribution. Had the client known more, he would have
chosen a "per capita" distribution. A beneficiary who would have received more under
the per capita approachm sues the lawyer for breach of the informed decisionmaking
doctrine. Because the privity and statute of limitations defenses effectively preclude any
recovery in most estate planning situations, a number of courts have rejected them in
the last several years. 149 These important developments strongly suggest that non-clients
will be able to recover under the informed decisionmaking doctrine in the estate planning
context. In addition, they illustrate the obvious importance of reforms to the viability of
an informed decisionmaking doctrine for estate planners.'"
Outside of estate planning, the privity defense also is falling. Both courts"' and
146 see, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (attorney has no liability to later third
parties); Favata v. Rosenberg, 106 III. App. 3d 572, 436 N.E,2d 49 (1982) (attorneys are not liable
to third parties); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (attorney's negligence does
not make the attorney liable to third parties); Schaller v. Schaller, 10 Ohio St. 3d 98, 462 N,E.2d
158 (1984) (an attorney who acts in good faith is immune from liability to third parties).
14' See, e.g„ Aker v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 483, 413 P.2d 153, 155-56, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553,
555-56 (1966); Master Mortgage Corp. v. Byers, 130 Ga. App. 97, 98, 202 S.E.2d 566, 567-68
(1973); Goldberg v. Bosworth, 29 Misc. 2d 1057, 1060, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
148 For example, the decedent's will might have provided "to my issue, per stirpes." If child A
and grandchildren C & D (the children of predeceased child B) survived the decedent, the share
under the will would be one-half to A and one-quarter each to C & D. A per capita share would
be one-third to each. Either C or D might make the claim in the text.
14° See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (privity should
be no bar); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal, Rpm 225 (1969) (statute of
limitations runs from date of death in will beneficiary situations); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (privity no longer always a defense; courts should balance
the factors involved) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Lorraine v. Grover, Cirnent, Weinstein &
Stauber P.A., 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. App. 1985) (some situations involving wills do not require privity);
McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. App. 1976) (privity not needed).
13° The text is brief because these developments have received thorough coverage elsewhere.
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 23, at 60-86; Johnston, supra note 28, at 645-50.
A rule against perpetuities case further illustrates the weakness of traditional approaches to
document interpretation and third-party liability. A will gave an interest to the children of the
testator's "brothers and sisters," then an open class because the testator's parents were alive (though
aged). Refusing to save the gift by limiting the class to those siblings alive when the testator died,
the House of Lords noted, "[hie [the testator] has used the words 'brother and sister' without
explanation or glossary, and I am afraid he must take the consequences." Ward v. Van der Loeff,
1924 A.C. 653 (Opinion of Lord Dunedin). cf. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES (3d ed. 1984) 809 n.15 (commenting on the quoted language as follows: "He must take
the consequences?").
131 See Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1976) (attorney, representing a general partnership, liable for damages to third party investor
whom the attorney's advice intended to benefit); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618
(1985) (mortgagor stated claim against mortgagee's lawyer under third-party beneficiary theory).
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commentators'" have urged that lawyers should be liable to third parties in a range of
situations.'" For example, stockholders might rely on bad securities law advice that the
lawyer gave to a corporation. Because stockholders foreseeably might so rely, a court
may find them to be proper plaintiffs. 154
 Third parties might be harmed in an informed
decisionmaking context as well. Consider our earlier example of a client who, inade-
quately informed about the consequences of Subchapter S election, insists upon a part-
nership form for a new business. 155
 If the inadequate advice prevented the formation
of the business, the lawyer harmed both the client and the other potential participants.
Because persons other than the client foreseeably might also suffer loss if the inadequate
advice to the client prevents her participation, the other members of the group which
never got together would be proper plaintiffs. The continuing erosion of the privity
defense is critical to enforcing an informed decisionmaking doctrine for estate planners.
Planners in other contexts as well ought to be aware that their failure to engage in
adequately-informed decisionmaking may subject them to liability to non-clients who
foreseeably might be harmed.' 56
As noted above, because a lawyer might have drafted a bad will years before a
problem was discovered on the testator's death, several recent estate planning decisions
have allowed statutes of limitation to run from the testator's death, rather than from the •
time of the drafting.'" In circumstances in which even the testator's death would not
But see Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 343-45, 556 P.2d 737, 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381
(1976); Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa. Super. 418, 476 A.2d 22 (1984) (plaintiff must show a lawyer—
client relationship in an action against a lawyer for professional negligence.) Cf. Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985) (attorney who formed tax shelter liable to investors for
misrepresentation when IRS disallowed shelters).
152 See Comment, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U.L. REV
415 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Attorney Liability]; Note, Attorney Negligence and Third Parties, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982); Comment, The Pelham Decision, Attorney Malpractice and Third-Party
Nonclient Recovery: The Rise and Fall of Privity, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 357 (1983); Comment, Lawyers'
Negligence Liability to Non-Clients: A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 405 (1983).
153
 Courts have imposed liability on other professionals who offer advice that can harm third
parties. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (accountants); Aluma Kraft
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (accountants); Quail Hollow E.
Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C. App. 518,  268 S.E.2d 12 (1980) (architects).
154 Cf. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 355, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (suggesting
corporate attorney's duty could extend to stock purchasers if it were foreseeable that the advice
would be transmitted to or relied upon by purchasers). An examination of the appropriate breadth
of liability to third parties in general is beyond the scope of this study. The approach casting the
broadest net, and the one used in the text for illustration, would allow any foreseeable plaintiff to
sue. Others have proposed a more limited abrogation of the privity doctrine. For a helpful analysis,
see Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982). See also, R. MALLEN
& V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 71-82 (2d ed. 1981); Comment, Attorney Liability, supra note
152.
15' See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
156
 Earlier I proposed that a client should have an action for dignitary harm suffered in
circumstances threatening the core of the lawyer-client relationship. See supra notes 136-43 and
accompanying text. Because the harm was to the dignity of the client, that claim should not be
available to third parties.
$37 See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Auric v.
Continental Cas. Co., I 1 I Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 154, at § 397; Note, Drafting Attorneys' Liability to Intended Beneficiaries of a Will: A Reasonable
Approach to Accrual of Statutes of Limitations, iS VAL. U.L. REV. 119 (1983).
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reveal a problem, courts should follow a "discovery rule" approach.' 58 Forexample, the
testator's will might have created a power of appointment for a survivor. Questions about
the adequacy of advice regarding the creation of the power might not arise until well
after the testator's death. Accordingly, statutes of limitation should begin to run when
the injured party reasonably should have discovered the lawyer's breach. 158
In sum, the law should direct at the lawyers themselves remedies for failure to
engage in informed decisionmaking. The sanctions might take either (or both) of two
forms: professional discipline for violation of ethics strictures or legal malpractice. The
new Model Rules of Professional Conduct's emphasis on meaningful communication
should help both lawyers and disciplinary bodies better appreciate the importance of
informed decisionmaking. To give teeth to the enforcement effort and compensation to
injured persons, courts should consider informed decisionmaking part of competent
legal representation. They should develop a malpractice doctrine which recognizes re-
liablity-of-evidence and difficulty-of-proof problems. Selective use of proof requirements
of clear and convincing evidence and of presumptions should tailor general malpractice
doctrine to the needs of informed decisionmaking. Furthermore, courts should set
damages in informed decisionmaking cases with reference to the situation in which the
breach arises. In most cases the burden should stay on the plaintiff and the court should
limit damages to what the injured client lost. In some special circumstances appropriate
presumptions should aid the plaintiff or the court should award the plaintiff attorneys'
fees or punitive damages. In addition, courts should allow third party recovery, and
statutes of limitation should run from the time a plaintiff should have discovered a
breach.
B. Reforming the Document
In a planning context, production of documents is often the primary goal of the
representation. Instead of directing their attention at lawyers, courts might remedy
harms by focusing on the documents produced in the absence of informed decision-
making. In many cases, reforming the documents to read as if there had -been an
informed decision might cure much of the harm. A significant risk to allowing refor-
mation in such cases, however, is that lawyers, at least partially relieved of malpractice
j " Courts have adopted the discovery rule, providing that a statute of limitations does riot
begin to run until the plaintiff knows or reasonably could have discovered the injury in a variety
of contexts. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, at § 30. In addition, courts have applied the
rule to attorney - malpractice. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176,
491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rpm 837 (1971). See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 154, at
§ 397.
ISO Courts also ought to follow a "discovery riile" approach in informed decisionmaking cases
outside of the estate planning area. The law is complex; courts should not expect clients to recognize
inadequacies in the representation they are getting. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 154,
§ 380 at 426-27 ("Frequently, the client did not know and usually could not have known he had a
cause of action because of his attorney's negligence .... Mhe client usually lacks the special skill
and knowledge necessary to recognize the difference between competence and negligence.") (em.
phasis in original).
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liability, will not take seriously their obligation to encourage informed decisionmaking. ,60
Nevertheless, because the relative strengths of a reformation approach outweigh the
deterrence value which results when the court limits plaintiffs to a malpractice remedy,
courts should treat inadequately informed decisionmaking as mistake for which refor-
mation is an appropriate remedy. Of course, reformation will not be appropriate in all
contexts, especially if other parties have relied upon documents.
Reformation has long been available as a way of correcting inter vivos documents
executed in the presence of fraud or mistake.' 61 Its purpose is to make the document
reflect what the parties intended. Traditional doctrine prohibits reformation of wills for
mistake because reformation would give effect to unattested language and thereby violate
the Statute of Wills. 162
 Problems unanticipated at the time of drafting, however, often
have been solved by a court interpreting a document as if it expressed what the parties
would have intended had they known more. 165
In a comprehensive and persuasive article, Professors Langbein and Waggoner
criticize such use of "construction" as a way to avoid unjust results. Instead, they propose
a carefully defined approach to reforming wills while recognizing the policies behind
160
 A different kind of risk of allowing reformation is that reformation will encourage unjus-
tifiable claims. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 589-90. Because the informed decision-
making doctrine involves asking "what would the client have done, if the client had known?," the
whole doctrine, rather than merely the reformation remedy, is subject to that kind of risk. One
check against nonmeritorious or frivolous claims would be to require clear and convincing evidence.
See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text. Lawyers who do engage in informed decisionmaking
can protect themselves by preserving evidence of their discussions. See supra notes 86-95 and
accompanying text.
101 See generally 4 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 20.1 (Mistake in Testamentary Dis-
position), § 20.2 (Wrongful Acquisition of a Bequest) (1978). A wide variety of documents have
been subject to reformation. See, e.g., Dyson v. Ferncliff Properties, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1985) (deed); Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities v. Phillips, 133
Ill. App. 3d 337, 478 N.E.2d 1052 (1985) (trust); Williams v. United Ins. Co. of America, 618
S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (contract, which court ultimately did not reform); George Backer
Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 211, 385 N.E.2d 1062, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135
(1978) (lease, which court ultimately did not reform); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 306 N.C. 545, 293 S.E.2d
777 (1982) (deed).
152 See 4 G. PALER, supra note 161, at 1 20.1.
163 See, e.g., Smith v. Usher, 108 Ga. 231, 233, 33 S.E. 876, 877 (1899) (court implied' cross-
remainders where testator "made no express disposition of the land in the event one daughter died
childless and the other had children, and this is the condition that has now arisen"); In re Wolcott,
95 N.H. 23, 26, 56 A.2d 641, 643 (1948) (court gave trustee "authority to do what the testator
presumably would have authorized had he foreseen the emergency"); In re Estate of Burke, 48 N.J.
50, 64, 222 A.2d 273, 280 (1966) (when a will does not provide for a particular contingency which
occurs, a court may "strive reasonably to ascertain and carry out what the testator probably intended
... if' the present situation developed").
When circumstances have changed, a drafter may not have addressed a particular problem
that arises. For a recent proposal to follow the English by taking a statutory approach to trust
revision in changed circumstances, see Comment, A Proposal for a Variation of Trusts Statute in
Washington, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. Ray. 625 (1985). See also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1985) (allowing judicial approval of changes in trust terms in some circumstances).
Contract law traditionally resolves unanticipated problems by deciding what reasonable persons
in the position of the parties would have meant had they anticipated the problem. See generally E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9 at 491-92 (1982). For discussion of whether an objective (reasonable
person) or subjective (individual client) approach is more appropriate in informed decisionmaking
cases, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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the Statute of Wills.'" Their approach is also appropriate for informed decisionmaking
problems.
Professors Langbein and Waggoner would allow courts to reform wills for mistake
if "the error be shown to have affected specific terms in the will," 165 the claim is "suffi-
ciently circumscribed to be susceptible to proof," 68 and the evidence is clear and con-
vincing.'" These requirements are intended to identify an appropriate line between the
cases clearly crying for reformation, such as when a husband and wife each sign the
other's will,'" and claims which are too generalized to be remediable, such as "'if only
my aunt had known how much I loved her, she'd have left me more." 69 The estate tax
marital deduction case of Estate of MitIleman v. Commissioner 17° is an example of a situation
between those extremes and yet appropriate for reformation."' In Mittleman, the attor-
ney testified that the decedent wanted to qualify for a marital deduction. The deduction
is allowed only if all of the income from the trust set up by the decedent goes to the
surviving spouse.' 72 The document stated that the trust's purpose was to provide the
widow support, but did not expressly direct that all of the income go to the widow,'"
Applying the Langbein and Waggoner analysis, a court could reform Mittleman's will
by concluding that the drafting error affected specific terms regarding the allocation of
the trust income, the widow's marital deduction claim was sufficiently circumscribed, and
the lawyer's testimony, other trust language and the size of the corpus provided clear
and convincing evidence of Mittleman's intent.
As noted earlier,' 74 Mittleman can also be seen as an informed decisionmaking case.
A document executed in the absence of informed decisionmaking can be viewed as a
mistakenly-executed document. As Langbein and Waggoner have demonstrated, the
appropriateness of reformation as a remedy for the mistake should not turn on whether
the document is a will. Rather, the concern ought to be the character of the proof
regarding what would have been done if the client had been adequately informed.
Though reformation may be consistent with established (or, in the case of wills,
emerging) doctrine, the remedy may be unsuitable in some contexts. To the extent that
reformation "cures" the harm caused by uninformed decisionmaking, it reduces the cost
164 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5. The authors demonstrate that courts use refor-
mation for mistakes regarding other wealth-transfer devices, such as deeds and trusts, and that
under current wills doctrine courts give testamentary effect to unattested language in a wide variety
of cases, ranging from resolving questions of "ambiguity" to reforming documents which violate
the rule against perpetuities. See id. at 524-54. They believe "that a reformation doctrine would
often constitute less an innovation in principle than in candor." Id. at 524.
16g
	
at 578. The authors call this requirement one of "materiality."
186 Id. The authors call this requirement one of "particularity."
1" Id. at 578-79.
186 See In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981); In re Estate of
Pavlinko, 394 Pa. 564, 148 A.2d 528 (1959). Mistakes of this sort might be very common. See
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 562 n.152.
166 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 584.
170 522 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
171 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 584. The authors indicate that reformation of
Rule Against Perpetuities violations is a parallel example. Id. at 549 n.104 (discussing the perpetuities
cases).
172 Mitileman, 522 F.2d at 135.
173 Id. at 133 n.l.
' 74 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
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to the offending lawyer. Consequently, lawyers could be tempted to be less careful. Other
pressures to communicate, however, will bear upon lawyers. 175
 Continued exposure to
the professional disciplinary process should provide some pressure.' 75
 Further, because
a drafter's goal is to avoid litigation, the risk of facing a reformation action would be an
incentive to many lawyers to communicate adequately. In addition, the costs of the
reformation action should be an element of damages in any malpractice action. In
appropriate malpractice cases, attorneys' fees and punitive damages also would be avail-
able, providing further incentives for lawyers to avoid the possibility of litigation.'"
Even jurisdictions which choose to limit most plaintiffs to a malpractice remedy
should allow reformation in some cases. A malpractice approach to informed decision-
making could deny recovery to worthy plaintiffs in two contexts. 178
 First, the court might
excuse the lawyer's breach because of the emergency circumstances in which the trans-
action occurred.' 79
 Second, the available damages might be inadequate. The award may
not cover lost profits or other "speculative" damages,'" or the loss may involve unique
property.' 8 ' Further, the lawyer may be judgment proof or underinsured. 182
Finally, reformation will not be appropriate in some informed decisionmaking cases.
Though most planning situations ultimately involve documents, not all do. With no
document, there is nothing to reform. Also, third parties, such as bona fide purchasers, 1 e"
may have relied on the document as written, so reformation would be unfair to them.
When contracts, as opposed to gifts, are involved, the law of reformation places emphasis
on what the parties actually agreed. Reformation then is appropriate only "to put into
effect the contract intended, not to make the contract the parties would have made had
they been better informed."'" In other cases, however, courts could use reformation to
" a
 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 588-90.
17 " Given the recognized deficiencies in that process, however, see supra authorities cited in note
105, we should not over-emphasize its effect on lawyer-client communication. Particularly in juris-
dictions which have not been aggressive in enforcing professional discipline or which have not
adopted professional standards regarding communication, the reformation remedy might be in-
appropriate.
177 See supra notes 138-40,144-45 and accompanying text.
In light of these incentives to be competent, a sensible system would not attempt to "punish"
lawyers by requiring harmed parties to bring malpractice actions worth only a fraction of the real
loss. The value of the malpractice claim would fall short of the actual loss because of the expenses,
delays, and risks of litigation. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 589. Cf. Spiegel, supra •
note 4, at 137-38 (discussing measures-of-damages problems posed by the suit-within-a-suit re-
quirement in malpractice cases, Spiegel notes, Iblefore verdict and judgment, ... [a lawsuit's] value
reflects an estimate of the probability of winning multiplied by the likely recovery."). Langbein and
Waggoner note another consideration: failure to reform may perpetuate unjust enrichment. See
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 589. For example, a rule limiting parties to a malpractice
remedy would allow the "wrong" will beneficiaries to keep their windfall while the lawyer pays
damages to the "right" ones. See, e.g., supra note 146.
"a
 Of course, the unavailability of a malpractice remedy does not require the availability of a
reformation remedy. Other factors may preclude reformation. See infra notes 183-85 and accom-
panying text.
"9 See supra note 21.
'" See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
l't See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 5, at 589.
"9 Id.
Ma See generally 3 G. PALMER, supra note 161, at 486-89 for a discussion of bona fide purchasers.
184 Id. at 16 (paraphrasing St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. Merriman, 35 Minn. 42,27
N.W. 199 (1886)). Professor Palmer notes that "it is often necessary to separate an agreement from
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aid a variety of victims of uninformed decisionmaking, especially in the context of gifts
gone awry. In some of these reformation cases an additional malpractice remedy might
also be appropriate to compensate fully the injured party. 185
LV. CONCLUSION
Clients deserve the opportunity to make fully informed decisions. The informed
decisionmaking doctrine developed here should encourage lawyers to help clients realize
that opportunity. It recognizes special obligations in conflict of interest situations because
such situations most threaten the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. It suggests
a broad standard — discussing topics relevant to each individual client — as a way to
resist the natural tendency to categorize clients and to treat them as members of typical
groups instead of as individuals. Only if lawyers maintain a dialogue on a wide range of
issues potentially relevant to each client will it be possible to discover which topics really
warrant further discussion. Perhaps most importantly, a complete discussion should
minimize the number of situations in which consequences follow even when no affir-
mative decision has been made, as when persons are bound by boilerplate language the
client did not understand.
Good lawyers always have understood the importance of learning enough about
their clients to be able to give adequate advice and of helping clients understand that
advice. The remedies discussed here — professional discipline, malpractice, and refor-
mation — all have been invoked as responses to inadequate advice. In order to shift the
focus from accuracy of the advice itself to adequacy of the decisionmaking process, this
article urges explicit recognition of an informed decisionmaking doctrine. Lawyers need
not only to understand the law, but also to teach their clients enough of the law so that
the clients can make intelligent decisions.
its objectives, and ... the role of reformation is to give effect to the former, not to attain the latter."
Id.
In contrast, "Rifle aim of reformation of an instrument of gill is to express in the writing the
gill the donor intended to so express." 4 G. PALMER, supra note 161, at 10. For reformation to work
in an informed decisionmaking context, it must allow courts to express in writing what the donor
would have intended, if adequately informed. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (rioting
that will "interpretation" has taken such an approach and suggesting that outright reformation is
more appropriate).
I " For example, consider a will beneficiary whose share was made smaller when a lawyer
wrongfully named himself as a beneficiary. A court could reform the will to eliminate the lawyer's
share, and the injured beneficiary could maintain a malpractice action for the cost of action,
attorney's fees, and, perhaps, punitive damages. Modern rules of procedure should allow a court
to handle all of the issues in one action, See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 2 (One Form of Action), 20
(Permissive Joinder of Parties).
